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Abstract 
This study examines the financial applications of blockchain technology beyond 
cryptocurrencies. Recent studies have addressed the regulatory issues and maturity of 
technological innovations in the context of cryptocurrencies, however, as the adoption of this 
technology in the financial environment proliferates, there is need to provide support for 
blockchain technology in advancing financial services and adding value in this ecosystem. By 
investigating the concepts of distributed ledger technologies, this study draws attention to the 
technology underlying blockchains; expanding the discussion about its challenges, 
implications and potential applications within the financial industry. This dissertation concludes 
on how applications of blockchain technology is still within its early stages and addresses the 
necessary changes in the financial ecosystem required to harness its potential. 
 
  
Table of Contents 
Glossary................................................................................................................................. i 
List of Tables and Figures ..................................................................................................... iii 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................. iv 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and Motivation ..................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research Problem .................................................................................................. 3 
1.3 Scope of discussion ................................................................................................ 3 
1.4 Research questions ................................................................................................ 4 
1.5 Research Objectives ................................................................................................... 4 
1.5 Structure ................................................................................................................. 4 
1.6 Research Methodology ........................................................................................... 5 
1.7 Limitations .............................................................................................................. 6 
2. The concepts and outline of Blockchain technology ....................................................... 7 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 7 
2.2 The Fundamentals of Blockchain Technology ......................................................... 8 
2.2.1 Distributed ledger technology ........................................................................... 8 
2.2.2 Encryption Protocol: Cryptographic Hash Functions and Digital signatures ..... 9 
2.2.3 Consensus Mechanism .................................................................................. 11 
2.3 Use case of Proof of Work scheme: Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism ................... 14 
2.3.1 The Structure of the blockchain ..................................................................... 15 
2.3.2 Transaction lifecycle within the Bitcoin network .............................................. 16 
2.3.3 Mining ............................................................................................................ 16 
2.4 Types of Blockchains ............................................................................................ 20 
2.5 The influence of cryptocurrencies on the financial industry ................................... 22 
2.5.1 Case study of Proof-of-Stake mechanism: Ethereum ..................................... 22 
2.5.2 Case study of InterLedger Protocol mechanism: Ripple ................................. 26 
2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 29 
  
3. The Application of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Industry ............................. 31 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 31 
3.2 Innovative Applications of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Industry .......... 34 
3.2.1 Smart Contracts ............................................................................................. 34 
3.2.2 Token management: Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) .......................................... 37 
3.3 Implications of Blockchain Technology on the Financial Industry .......................... 40 
3.3.1 Reducing transaction costs and improving efficiency ..................................... 41 
3.3.2 Identity Management ..................................................................................... 41 
3.3.3 Major impact to the real economy .................................................................. 42 
3.3.4 Personalised financial services ...................................................................... 42 
3.3.5 Peer to Peer payment channels ..................................................................... 42 
3.3.6 Improving Clearing, Settlement, and Record-Keeping Processes .................. 42 
3.3.7 Automated Contract Execution ...................................................................... 43 
3.3.8 Digital record keeping .................................................................................... 43 
3.3.9 Ownership Proof ............................................................................................ 43 
3.3.10 Reengineering the process of underwriting and assessing risk for leveraged loan 
trading 44 
3.3.11 Protecting Intellectual Property and creating a decentralised Proof-of-Existence 
mechanism .................................................................................................................. 44 
3.3.12 Financial innovation ....................................................................................... 44 
3.3.13 Sharing Economy .......................................................................................... 45 
3.3.14 Audit Trail ...................................................................................................... 45 
3.3.15 Regulation compliance ................................................................................... 45 
3.4 Industry-specific applications of blockchain technology ......................................... 47 
3.4.1 Payments, Clearing and Settlement ............................................................... 47 
3.4.2 Trade Finance ................................................................................................ 48 
3.4.3 Capital Markets: Digital issuance, trading and settlements of securities ......... 50 
3.5 Conclusion: Steering financial inclusion via Blockchain solutions .......................... 52 
4. Challenges of Blockchain Technology .......................................................................... 55 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 55 
  
4.2 Performance ......................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.1 Energy Intensive Consumption ...................................................................... 55 
4.2.2 Scalability ...................................................................................................... 55 
4.3 Technological Challenges ..................................................................................... 56 
4.3.1 Usability ......................................................................................................... 56 
4.3.2 Operational risks of transition ......................................................................... 57 
4.4 Regulatory Challenges .......................................................................................... 57 
4.4.1 Standardisation .............................................................................................. 57 
4.4.2 Compliance and governance ......................................................................... 58 
4.5 Legal issues .......................................................................................................... 61 
4.5.1 Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................... 61 
4.5.2 Legal Liability ................................................................................................. 61 
4.5.3 Legal enforceability of Smart Contracts .......................................................... 61 
4.6 Security Issues ..................................................................................................... 63 
4.6.1 Key Management ........................................................................................... 63 
4.6.2 Privacy Management ..................................................................................... 64 
4.6.3 Network Influence .......................................................................................... 65 
4.7 Economic Drawbacks ........................................................................................... 66 
4.7.1 Redundancy .................................................................................................. 66 
4.7.2 Cost Mutualisation ......................................................................................... 66 
4.7.3 Financial Crime .............................................................................................. 67 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 68 
List of References ............................................................................................................... 70 
 
 i 
 
Glossary  
Public-key 
cryptography 
Asymmetric encryption involving cryptographic algorithms where pairs of 
encryption keys are used, usually one public and one private. A public key 
can be used both to authenticate signatures made with the corresponding 
private key and to encrypt data, which is only possible to decrypt using the 
private key. 
Blockchain A digital management technology platform for immutable decentralised 
databases that facilitates trust, security, and automation in complex 
networks of systems and actors by leveraging cryptography and distributed 
consensus mechanisms. 
DAO An organisation being run completely algorithmically, using smart contracts 
distributed on a blockchain. 
Ecosystem An open social system of organisational fields that consist of directly, 
indirectly, and less formally interdependent actors, technologies, and 
institutions. 
P2P-transactions Parties engaging in direct transactions or contractual agreements with 
each other, in the absence of a mediator or a trusted third party that 
facilitates the activity by providing authentication and guarantee services. 
Cryptocurrency A digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions 
as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a 
store of value but does not have legal tender status.  It incorporates 
principles of cryptography to implement a distributed, decentralised, secure 
information economy 
Distributed 
ledger 
technology 
A technology upon which records of transactions are “spread across 
multiples sites, countries or institutions, and (are) typically public” (World 
Economic Forum, 2016). Transaction records are stored one after the other 
in a continuous ledger, but they can only be added when participants 
confirm the feasibility and validity of the transaction. 
Distributed 
ledger 
A database structure that replicates and maintains a complete record of 
transaction history, with participating nodes being continuously updated on 
the state of the ledger. In order to create system resiliency, a shared ledger 
is kept on an open and decentralised network with equal constituent value; 
namely a single authoritative record of all transaction information is 
replicated across the network and is available to any node at any given 
time. 
 ii 
 
Node Every network participant that contributes to maintaining the blockchain. 
They can be members or systems of a consensus network or a server that 
holds a replicated copy of the ledger and can have varying roles: to fulfil 
functions such as issuing, verifying, receiving and informing. For all intents 
and purposes, a node can also be a virtual machine (Seibold and Samman, 
2016). 
Smart contract In the context of blockchain technology, it involves running distributed 
computer code in a blockchain network. It was initiated as a feature to do 
scripted transactions but evolved into more advanced ways of distributing 
discretionary code. 
Consensus 
Mechanism 
A mutual verification procedure that aims to maintain a continuously 
updated state of the ledger. The process of achieving consensus includes 
pre-determined and immutable agreement on updating content kept 
amongst participating nodes. 
Encryption 
protocol 
A security protocol that uses cryptographic proofs to verify the validity and 
integrity of data maintained and propagated across the network. In the 
context of blockchain technology, the protocol is characterised using hash 
functions (encryption techniques) and digital signatures (cryptographic 
proofs) that allow mutually distrustful parties to interact and produce 
verifiable proof of the data kept on a distributed ledger. 
Forking In software development, a fork is when a copy of the source code is made 
to start a separate independent path of development. It is also used to refer 
to the branching of a blockchain into two or more chains. 
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AML/KYC Anti-Money Laundering / Know Your Customer 
BFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance  
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
dApp Distributed Applications 
DoS Denial of Service 
DLT Decentralised Ledger Technology 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
FSP  Financial Service Provider 
MSB Money Service Business 
P2P Peer to Peer 
PoS Proof of Stake 
PoW Proof of Work 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SME Small and Medium Enterprise 
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The convergence of technological breakthroughs in high-speed internet access and the need 
for reform across financial systems has triggered innovation capable of disrupting and 
reinventing the role of the traditionally conservative financial industries. As financial systems 
continuously increase their reliance upon technological solutions to conduct work processes 
and automate business functions, a digital era of innovative business solutions has emerged 
within financial industries to provide efficiencies in their operational capacities. 
 
The emergence of cryptocurrencies brought attention to the innovation of decentralised ledger 
technology (DLT) and its capability to provide value within financial industries. Despite, the 
conception and development of DLT having spanned decades, the growing global interest for 
adopting blockchain technology signifies the potential of DLT in creating opportunities to 
change business models and expand the capabilities of existing systems. Decentralised 
ledger technology (DLT) embraces the complexity, diversity and risk of changing social 
structures led by a technologically driven culture; through creating innovative approaches to 
interacting within global networks. In another way, the technology explores the opportunity to 
create decentralised and distributed networks of information exchange within financial 
systems. Consequently, such innovations have the potential to introduce new products and 
services that bring forth efficiencies in reducing processing times and operational costs. 
 
When Nakamoto (2008) introduced Bitcoin, the initial motivation for its conception was to 
address the overarching influence of centralised governing authorities and mitigate the 
systemic risks that had impacted global financial markets as a result of a centralised system. 
Centralised ledger systems as a single point of failure contributed to the market inefficiencies 
and bottlenecks that affected financial systems during the financial crisis of 2008; the lack of 
operational reliability required to monitor spending, credit and investment activity exposed 
consumers, investors and financial institutions alike to significant risk factors; handle clearing 
and settlement cycles; and facilitated global e-commerce in a centralised transactional model. 
As the pioneering application of blockchain technology, Bitcoin was created as a decentralised 
payment system that secured transactions without an arbitrator by validating transactions 
using cryptographic proofing. In other words, it incorporated principles of cryptography to 
implement a distributed, decentralised, secure information economy (FATF, 2016). 
 
The underlying mechanisms applied with blockchain technology enable an environment which 
is not dependent on trust and preserves the integrity, uniqueness and validity of information 
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stored on a database without the moderation of third parties. By leveraging the technology in 
the financial industry, cryptocurrencies represent an innovative approach to the digitisation of 
diverse forms of value exchange. The identification and traceability of transactions attributed 
to its underlying mechanisms allow participants to acquire a secure, transparent and auditable 
record of every transaction executed in the system (Cuccuru, 2017). As a result, 
cryptocurrencies offer a payment system that renders the information on the value exchanged 
and key identities involved in the activity as verifiable and tamper proof. By reducing high 
transaction costs, facilitating immediate settlement and securing transaction processes, this 
technology threatens the role the banking sector has held in intermediating value exchange—
especially in the field of international payments. Conventionally, the function of 
institutionalising financial intermediaries in facilitating transactions has mitigated financial risk, 
however, the presence of third-party action has led to inefficiencies in prolonging settlement 
times and increasing costs; owing to the complexity and challenges of maintaining digital 
payment platforms in a centralised system. 
 
The success of cryptocurrencies has precipitated the wider application of blockchain 
technology in different sectors of the financial industry. The application of DLT in the case of 
blockchain provides opportunities for stakeholders by reconfiguring business models, creating 
new products and services, and in some cases disrupting and reinventing entire value chains 
(Scott, 2015). An emerging culture driven towards technology-led business platforms 
presages the evolution of distributed collaborative organisations that could alter the future of 
the financial services sector. Such organisational structures have the potential to improve  the 
automation of internal processes, expand distribution channels, reform governance structures 
and offer innovative financial services (Scott, Loonam and Kumar, 2017; Salampasis and 
Mention, 2018). 
 
The study intends to find the current position of blockchain technology in the financial industry 
and discuss future perspectives for its implementation. The significance of innovation in the 
financial sector has shown the increasing role of technological solutions in simplifying currency 
exchange and remittances, disintermediating governance and enabling securities issuance. 
This research seeks to investigate the application of blockchain technology across various 
applications within asset management, clearing and settlement processes, operational risk 
and regulatory assessment within financial systems. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
Related literature in this field has primarily focused on a systematic review of cryptocurrencies, 
highlighting factors influencing the adoption of cryptocurrencies in different usage scenarios 
for different stakeholders (Polasik, Piotrowska, Wisniewski, Kotkowski and Lightfoot, 2015; 
Walch, 2015; Ciaian, Rajcaniova and d'Artis, 2016; Hong, 2017). However, major 
breakthroughs in the technical capabilities of its implementation, coupled with the wide range 
of applications that have emerged as result of its popularity have brought attention to the lack 
of discussion regarding its application within different sectors of the industry. Subsequently, 
the limited scope of understanding about its potential use raises questions on the socio-
economic and technical implications that could result from its application across various 
sectors. 
 
A principal concern associated with the current research on blockchain technology is the 
relatively small number of academic journals and high-quality publications pertaining to the 
effects of this technology in the financial sector (Tschorsch and Scheuermann, 2016; Yli-
Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park and Smolander, 2016). Henceforth, there is a need to conduct more 
studies on blockchain technology beyond cryptocurrencies, exploring the possibilities of 
further applications in the financial industry that could benefit from blockchain-based solutions. 
This study contributes through expanding the current literature on blockchain technology in its 
application to the financial industry as well as evaluating the feasibility and providing a critical 
perspective to innovative applications that are supported by blockchain-based solutions. 
 
1.3 Scope of discussion 
Firstly, this study outlines the technical concepts of blockchain technology, exploring how key 
features to this innovation exhibit the potential to disrupt the financial industry. It also 
acknowledges the social, economic and political implications of implementation; however, the 
scope of discussion is focused on identifying and evaluating the role of business solutions 
supported by blockchain as mainstream financial systems. Likewise, the study conducts 
current analysis of use-cases that have gained attention in the financial industry, explaining 
the potential for significant innovation for the financial system. However, this study is focused 
only on leading uses-cases of blockchain technology in the financial sector and does not 
provide an exhaustive list. Secondly, the research investigates how developing issues in 
adoption, regulatory uncertainty and operational awareness have contributed to the perception 
of this technology. 
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1.4 Research questions  
The research questions for this study were: 
1. What potential outcomes could be expected from the application of blockchain 
technology in the financial industry? 
2. What are the limitations to DLTs’ implementation and what are the steps required to 
further their development for broader applicability? 
3. How does the diffusion of innovation in blockchain technology within the financial 
industry challenge the concept of centralised systems? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
This study focuses on the research gap that exists within the intersection of concepts and 
technical aspects of blockchain technology and the potential for implementation in a variety of 
industries. Question one focuses on extending the discourse of blockchain technology to 
identifying and evaluating possibilities of value-creation in the financial sector. More 
specifically, the study investigates how blockchain redefines value exchange and business 
models that characterise financial systems by discussing key factors influencing its 
implementation. Question two highlights the potential risks and challenges that have arisen 
from the implementation of this technology across a wide range of applications. It extends the 
discussion of blockchain technology from the use of cryptocurrencies to other use-cases that 
have developed from identifying and addressing issues that influence its adoption. Question 
three evaluates the impact of blockchain technology against the role of existing infrastructures 
and processes that underlie financial systems. It addresses the potential of this technology to 
change financial systems in terms of transparency, security, data integrity, privacy, stability, 
governance and regulatory compliance. 
 
1.5 Structure  
This dissertation is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces blockchain technology 
and provides the research design for the subject matter. Chapter 2 outlines the definitions and 
explanations of fundamental concepts within blockchain technology, providing history on its 
development. It follows on to discuss underlying characteristics of the blockchain technology, 
mapping these characteristics onto the case studies of Ethereum and Ripple to provide clarity 
regarding the application of the technology. Chapter 3 examines how the technology could 
affect and benefit the financial industry beyond its use in the field of cryptocurrencies. It 
explores the innovative applications and use-cases of blockchain technology within different 
sectors of the financial industry: elaborating further upon its implications as a disruptive 
innovation. Chapter 4 presents the current challenges and limitations of blockchain technology 
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in relation to the development and adoption of the technology for financial applications. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the study by summarising the key findings. It concludes 
with the identification of potential areas of future research in the field of blockchain technology. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
In order to answer the research questions, this dissertation follows a qualitative approach to 
exploring the influence of blockchain technology in the financial industry. An exploratory 
research study based on literature analysis provides an understanding of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats of adopting blockchain platforms for the global financial 
industry. This entails the identification of possible applications of blockchain technology in the 
financial sector by evaluating their implementation in the fields of identity management, cross-
border payments and remittances, capital markets, asset registries and smart contracts. 
The following steps to this research design include: 
 
Step 1  
The research establishes a theoretical framework that describes and explains the key 
concepts of this technology. An extensive literature review provides a primer to the concept of 
blockchains and other technologies used in the functions of financial systems. From evaluating 
the technical implementation of this technology within the use-case of cryptocurrencies, the 
study develops further upon investigating feasible areas of implementation for this technology. 
 
Step 2 
The study identifies and discusses the key characteristics and business value of blockchain 
technology in the financial industry. The characteristics of blockchain technology were 
identified through gaining a comprehensive understanding of the technology and mapped to 
the existing applications and industry sectors that have shown significant interest in this 
innovation. Key findings were used for analysing technology implementation cases and 
discussing their implications in the industry. The objective is to assess whether integrating 
solutions supported by blockchain technology might in some cases help achieve the goals of 
existing projects and processes in these areas. 
 
Step 3  
The study identifies and discusses key challenges of adopting and developing blockchain 
technology. It investigates how performance, technical, regulatory and market-related issues 
undermine the potential for integrating blockchain solutions within the industry. In the same 
manner, the study elaborates on some of the inherent risks that are introduced when 
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blockchain technology is implemented within a financial environment which is highly regulated, 
competitive and inflexible to institutional change. 
 
1.7 Limitations 
Due to the lack of clarity regarding the terminology and perceived immaturity of the technology, 
there is no conclusive approach to defining and distinguishing differences in the technical 
implementation of blockchain in the field of decentralised ledger technologies (Rand Europe, 
2017). Therefore, research in this field is in its early stage of identifying and establishing 
standards, documentation and piloting that enables the capacity of this technology. The terms 
DLT and Blockchain shall be used synonymously to equate the similarity of concepts in the 
context of this technology. 
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2. The concepts and outline of Blockchain technology  
2.1 Introduction  
The innovation of blockchain technology was result of a combination of existing technological 
concepts; namely peer-to-peer networks, cryptographic algorithms, distributed data storage 
and decentralised consensus mechanisms (Wright and Filippi, 2015). Independently, these 
concepts had been applied in different contexts and provided substantial functionalities within 
an environment where information security was a key factor to developing new infrastructures. 
Blockchain technology introduces a new data structure with the potential to execute 
transactions in a more discreet, efficient and cost-effective way than the existing centralised 
network of financial services (Seibold and Samman, 2016). A frontier in the financial industry 
that enables disruption by developing distributed systems that securely exchange/transfer 
units of value amongst participants in a network. 
 
As the name suggests, blockchain is a database of blocks containing batches of approved 
transactions grouped together into smaller encrypted data sets (Zohar, 2015). Each block 
contains transaction details and network parameters that are essential to verifying 
transactions and maintaining the integrity of the database. The chain is formed by organising 
the blocks into a linear sequence which represents a chain and provides an audit trail of 
transaction histories (Pazaitis, Filippi and Kostakis, 2017). These features within the data 
structure of blockchain provide flexibility to handle diverse sets of data capable of storing 
property titles, contracts, voting decisions, assets and identities (Scott, et al., 2017).  
 
In this manner, blockchain technology addresses some of the underlying concerns of 
centralised systems that maintain financial infrastructures. These issues include: 
1) Lack of a single version of the truth or audit trails creates arbitrage concerns 
2) Asymmetric information between market participants drives the proliferation of central 
authorities 
3) Lack of transparency increases regulation on financial institutions 
4) Lack of trust between counterparties creates the need for central authority oversight 
in contract execution 
It is hoped that the adoption of the technology underpinning Bitcoin can reduce costs, cut out 
intermediaries, and increase efficiencies in the back end of the financial industry. As the 
blockchain ecosystem expands, enablers within the industry seek to develop platforms for 
applications and solutions that provide cryptographically secured transactions with full 
provenance and chains of custody, immutability, perfect auditability, selective privacy, 
 8 
 
business automation through smart contracts, and automatic reconciliation of information 
between all parties involved (Bauman, Lindblom and Olsson, 2016). 
 
In the following sections of this chapter, the study outlines and explains the fundamentals to 
blockchain technology. Section 2.2 defines and explains the concepts of distributed ledger 
technology, encryption protocols and consensus mechanisms that make up this technology. 
Section 2.3 provides a case study of Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism (Proof of work). Section 
2.4 compares the characteristics of different technical implementations of blockchains. Section 
2.5 investigates the influence of cryptocurrencies in the financial industry with the cases of 
Ripple and Ethereum. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes with some reflections on the opportunities 
for blockchain technology in the financial industry.  
 
2.2 The Fundamentals of Blockchain Technology 
2.2.1 Distributed ledger technology  
Despite DLT referring to a broader scope of technological solutions, blockchain signifies a 
unique arrangement of these technical concepts used to create and verify a continuously 
growing, append-only data structure (Natarajan, Krause and Gradstein, 2017). For blockchain 
technology, the architecture of distributed database presents an opportunity to adopt a 
technological solution whose role could support an entire financial system, enabling the safety 
and efficiency of payment, clearing, settlement and recording other financial transactions 
without the function of central counterparties, payment processors or trade repositories 
(Rosner and Kang, 2016: 667). 
 
As briefly discussed in the previous section, DLT integrates the concepts of peer-to-peer 
networks, distributed ledgers and cryptographic proofs that allow mutually distrustful parties 
to interact within an ecosystem that guarantees a high degree of operational reliability, security 
and potential to scale. In the case of blockchain technology, distributed ledgers are 
decentralised database architectures that utilise cryptographic and algorithmic methods to 
record and synchronise data across a network (Natarajan, et al., 2017). Collectively, these 
concepts contribute to maintaining the blockchain by using the functions of: Firstly, appending 
data containing several transaction records into a chain of datasets known as a ‘block’ in a 
shared and continuously updated ledger; Secondly, using cryptographic proofs (such as digital 
signatures) to encrypt data in the new data blocks and ensure transaction details are secured; 
Thirdly, using log replication to provide information about this new data block to all nodes in 
the network and lastly, allowing network participants to determine the validity of the data block 
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according to a consensus mechanism. Only after validation are participants allowed to add 
the new block to their previous record and broadcast changes to the ledger by replicating the 
recently updated state of the ledger across the entire network. As a result, all network 
participants have a full, identical copy of the entire ledger at any point in time (Natarajan, et 
al., 2017). 
 
Distributed ledgers are intended to create decentralised networks that preserve properties of 
fault tolerance, attack resistance and collusion resistance. With fault tolerance, the 
configuration of the network mitigates the risk of operational failure when one or more 
components of the system experiences downtime. Attack resistance eliminates the security 
vulnerabilities of having a singular point of failure shown in centralised systems by 
decentralising the function of participating nodes across the network. Lastly, collusion 
resistance entails pre-emptive measures that deter nodes from performing harmful collusive 
behaviour. All things considered, these attributes are coupled with a governance mechanism 
that renders blockchains as “politically decentralised [with no central authority] and 
architecturally decentralised [with no central point of failure] but logically centralised [with a 
formalised and codified governance ruleset]” (Buterin and Griffith, 2017). 
 
2.2.2 Encryption Protocol: Cryptographic Hash Functions and Digital signatures 
The universal availability of data based on open source architecture of blockchains often calls 
for the security risks and network access issues that undermine the integrity and confidentiality 
of data exchanged within a decentralised network. In order to maintain the security of DLT 
systems that rely on encryption techniques that preserve confidentiality, the blockchain 
protocol employs data signature schemes and cryptographic proofs to encrypt all sensitive 
data on the ledger and restrict access to rights using public keys generated by hash functions 
(ISSA, 2018). 
 
2.2.2.1 Hash Functions (Asymmetric Encryption) 
An underlying element to data security within a decentralised network is the use of encryption 
protocols that ensure that sensitive data is protected and only accessible to its intended 
recipients. Hash cash functions represent algorithms that transform input data of arbitrary 
length into a fixed-length output (hash value). The key principle supporting hash cash functions 
is that they should be computationally cheap to verify, however, expensive to compute when 
parameters are adjusted. In that sense, the anonymity of transacting parties and confidentiality 
of data is preserved by using hash values that are indeterminable from the input data and 
cannot be easily reverted to original content. Therefore, hash functions fulfill these security 
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requirements by using an asymmetric approach to data encryption that is one-way and 
infeasible to revert. 
 
In order to guarantee these security outcomes, different hash function implementations are 
expected to show properties provided in ISSA (2018) as: 
1) Deterministic: Always outputting the same hash for a given input; 
2) Pre-image resistant: Being inexpensive to generate and infeasible to reproduce the 
original content from the hash value generated; 
3) Ensuring a minor change to the input, outputs an uncorrelated hash; 
4) Hash collision: It being infeasible to find two different inputs which generate the same 
hash. 
Hash functions address the aspect of confidentiality by only sharing a replicated set of hashes 
corresponding to sensitive data only known to transacting parties (Kaushal, 2016a). Therefore, 
by restricting data access to entities involved, data confidentiality is preserved without a trade-
off on the network-wide integrity of the shared, replicated ledger (ISSA, 2018). For example, 
the parent hash function (hashcash-SHA1) introduced by Adam Black was intended for 
information-security applications to deter spam and denial-of-service attacks. In the same 
manner, the bitcoin-blockchain system implements a version of the SHA-256 function; more 
specifically denoted as the double-SHA256 function which performs two hash iterations on 
input data to produce a 256-bit character hash value. The authenticity of potential blocks to 
be added on the blockchain system is easily verifiable but difficult to reproduce. Moreover, 
these algorithms are implemented implicitly to guarantee data security, as any tampering of 
data would result in a different hash value, providing identifiable proof of tampering. 
 
2.2.2.2 Data Signatures  
In order to confirm the integrity data broadcast on the network, more specifically, the validity 
of transactions, data signatures are used in conjunction with hash functions (asymmetric 
cryptographic procedures) to sign all transactions before they are committed to the ledger. A 
digital signature is a representation of the validity or agreement that a certain transaction was 
performed and produced verifiable proof of transaction details. This provides a provable record 
that all entities agreed to the transaction or an update that can be independently verified by 
others using public and private key cryptography (ISSA, 2018). 
 
Asymmetric key cryptography entails the use of algorithms to generate a key pair (namely 
Public and Private keys) that verify digital signatures. Based on the Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the relationship of the key pair represents a cryptographic link 
between the algorithms of the encryption key (or public key) and of the decryption key (or 
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private key). Since both keys are generated using hash functions, it is expected that the data 
of the private key (confidential to the intended recipients) cannot be reproduced from the data 
of the public key (available to all participants in the network). In addition, the key pair relation 
must follow such that each part key can only be used in conjunction with its associative other 
(Kaushal, 2016a:16517). 
 
For example, ECDSA is employed for the function of key pair generation, digital signatures 
and verification procedures in authenticating interactions in the Bitcoin network. Bhaskar and 
Chuen (2015) states that new key pairs can be generated for every transaction made and 
each creation is independent of the prior derivation. Likewise, the Bitcoin protocol combines 
the SHA1 hash function and ECDSA algorithms for transaction signature generation and 
verification. Henceforth, Bitcoin addresses are derived from hashing the public key by using 
ECDSA and hash functions; more specifically SHA256 and RIPEMD160 (Bhaskar and Chuen, 
2015; Böhme, Christin, Edelman and Moore 2016). The private key associated with the Bitcoin 
address provides its ownership and full control (Kaushal, 2016a). 
 
Therefore, public key cryptography is intended to verify the data that is maintained and 
propagated on the network through digital signature. When transaction parties want to send 
the ‘message’ of the proposed transaction over the network, the transaction first needs to be 
encrypted. A public key is used to perform a function on the message such that it produces a 
digital signature and the validity of this signature can be confirmed with the corresponding 
private key. By combining the hash value of the message with the private key, an owner of the 
private key proves that they sent the message (accordingly, the counter party decrypts the 
digital signature to obtain a hash value and compares that to original hash value).  
 
2.2.3 Consensus Mechanism 
Blockchain technology provides an alternative way of building trust through transparency and 
consensus, with participants engaging in a cooperative process to construct the distributed 
ledger, and record and verify every entry in the ledger (ASTRI, 2017). There are several 
variants to algorithms used to build consensus, however, each implementation is configured 
to optimise performance, scalability, consistency, security and operational resiliency that 
match the requirements of its application. The difficulty of designing consensus algorithms is 
shown by inherent trade-offs that put distributed ledgers at risk of security vulnerabilities and 
business risks that arise from applying such systems within specific use-cases. 
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A central task in designing functional protocols is specifying a mechanism that incentivises 
rational agents to behave in certain ways, based upon their private information, that leads to 
socially desired outcomes. However, an obstacle to developing consensus mechanisms is 
trying to incentivise validation to secure the correct current state of a distributed ledger which 
is itself difficult when the validators themselves are highly complex agents that are free to 
interact in arbitrary ways. This concern often results in network partitions, communication 
delays, system overloads and corrupted messages that deter participating nodes from 
achieving consensus over the state of the ledger. For example, Collomb and Sok (2016:106) 
argue that economic incentives in the Bitcoin system have led to negative externalities such 
as ‘industrial-scale mining pools’ and selfish mining activities that promote anti-competitive 
behaviour, which are predicaments that oppose the fundamentals of establishing a blockchain 
platform. 
 
A fundamental problem of consensus mechanisms on distributed systems is overcoming 
malicious behaviour and system failures caused by faulty nodes within the network. This 
problem is called the ‘Byzantine General Problem’ (BGP). Lamport, Shostak and Pease 
(1982:383-384) provide an analogy of this problem as the difficulty faced by generals of the 
Byzantine army that attempted to coordinate themselves towards attacking Rome using 
messengers, where one of the generals may be a traitor. While consensus protocols can 
radically reduce bureaucracy, developing reliable systems that can tolerate faults and achieve 
consensus is a difficult task. With that in mind, securing consensus on a distributed system 
requires developers to consider building consensus protocols that tolerate Byzantine failures.  
 
Byzantine failures can be characterised as the arbitrary ways in which components of a system 
can fail, which prevent various components of a system from achieving consensus over the 
current state of the ledger (Lamport, et al., 1982). Byzantine failures usually occur when: 
1) participants broadcast incorrect process requests;  
2) participants broadcast incorrect process requests;  
3) malicious nodes attempt to corrupt the state of the distributed ledger;  
4) the system produces incorrect and/or inconsistent outputs. 
For example, cryptocurrencies are susceptible to system failures when adversarial conditions 
(such as malicious activities, collusion with other participants, and selective non-participation) 
compromise the state of the ledger.  
 
BFT systems presume that the network operates under adversarial conditions in perpetuity, 
therefore reaching consensus involves building protocols that anticipate and tolerate recurring 
byzantine failures of the network (Mermer, Zeydan and Arslan, 2018). A common approach 
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for achieving BFT in distribution is state machine replication. A state machine refers to a 
process driven by a series of inputs (transactions) that ensure nodes executing them will 
transition to a new state based on whether the transactions are valid or not. Replication 
involves distributing the shared state across multiple replicas such that in the case where a 
fraction of the network is compromised, the remaining replicas safeguard the functionality of 
components in the system and recover from failures of nodes participating in consensus. 
 
Therefore, the applicability and efficacy of BFT algorithms on achieving consensus are 
determined by the following properties stated in Gramoli (2017): 
1) Agreement (Safety) – A consensus protocol is determined to be safe if all nodes 
produce the same output and the outputs produced by nodes are valid according to 
predefined rulesets. This is also referred to as consistency of the shared state. 
2) Termination (Liveness) – A consensus protocol guarantees liveness if all non-faulty 
nodes participating in consensus eventually produce a value  
3) Validity (Fault tolerance) - A consensus protocol provides fault tolerance if it can 
recover from failures of nodes participating in consensus. 
Under adversarial conditions, there is a possibility that malevolent actors within an 
asynchronous network would gain control of the scheduling/delivery of messages between 
network participants. Asynchronous networks represent a system that has no presumptions 
regarding the bound for processing time or communication delays. In case of a byzantine 
failure occurring, adversaries arbitrarily delay messages preventing the system from finalising 
consensus within predictable timeframes. A twofold implication on the properties of BFT 
systems becomes apparent:  the liveliness of the system is compromised; and  the trade-off 
of accomplishing consistency of the shared state (safety) against diminishing liveliness 
becomes difficult to manage. Therefore, developers building reliable and robust distributed 
systems tend to examine inherent trade-offs of safety and liveness in a network prone to 
byzantine failure. In order to design such BFT systems, networks are configured to address 
varying system requirements and assumptions that improve throughput and minimise end-to-
end latencies (Zhao and Villaseca, 2008). 
 
For distributed systems to reach Byzantine consensus, the consensus protocol must provide 
safety, liveliness and fault tolerance. However, an inevitable element to achieving Byzantine 
consensus is that no deterministic consensus protocol can guarantee fulfilling all these 
properties and demonstrates the impossibility of achieving distributed consensus in an 
asynchronous network (Fischer, Lynch and Paterson 1985). Brewer (2000) developed the 
CAP theorem that highlights the key properties of a BFT system and postulates that any 
distributed system subject to communication failures (asynchronous networks) should 
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guarantee a response to every service request generated on the network for it to achieve 
Byzantine consensus. 
 
All things considered, consensus algorithms allow any entity participating in its consensus 
group to append a block to the blockchain for validation by the rest of the network. Only once 
minimum thresholds of consensus nodes, depending on the protocol used, have accepted the 
block, are the transactions it contains considered committed (ISSA, 2018). Some consensus 
algorithms permit transaction finality and others make it increasingly unlikely that a transaction 
will be reversed with each additional block appended (ISSA, 2018). Consensus algorithms 
allow for a certain number of nodes to be faulty or even malicious and for the network to still 
proceed with integrity. The number of nodes that are required to collude to halt the progress 
of the ledger depends on the protocol used. The primary purpose of consensus algorithms is 
to alleviate the need for a trusted entity, especially within a financial context where security 
guarantees, political neutrality and censorship resistance are key determinants to managing 
activities carried out over a decentralised network. 
 
2.3 Use case of Proof of Work scheme: Bitcoin’s consensus mechanism 
The primary function of achieving consensus in an open, trust less and decentralised 
environment is to provide a secure process to updating a distributed shared state of the 
transaction record; validating each transaction and subsequently broadcasting the validated 
result to all the nodes in the distributed ledger. In the Bitcoin network, the process of achieving 
consensus is performed by the Proof-Of-Work (PoW) scheme that uses cryptographic hash 
functions and data signatures within the verification process, the payment process and to 
manage the number of Bitcoins (Badev and Chen, 2014). 
 
The following sections provide understanding of the concepts of PoW through:  
1) description of the structure of blockchain 
2) an overview of the transaction lifecycle in the Bitcoin network 
3) the consensus function of PoW known as “mining” 
.
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2.3.1 The Structure of the blockchain 
The structure of blockchain data is a well-ordered, back-linked list of transaction blocks, with 
each block containing reference to the previous block which can be recursively mapped back 
to the first block formed (the genesis block). Table 2.1 explains the fields of the block details 
as each block comprises of metadata providing information of the transactions and a block 
header that are used for the PoW algorithm. The block header consists of version, previous 
block hash (Block Header), merkle root, timestamp, bits (difficulty target) and nonce. Each of 
these parameters provides necessary information that enables transaction blocks to added to 
the chain. 
 
Table 2.1: Data structure of a block 
Field  Description 
Version A version number to track software/protocol upgrades 
Previous Block Hash A reference to the hash of the previous (parent) block in the chain 
Merkle Root A representation of the hash value of all the transactions in the block. 
Timestamp The approximate creation time of this block. 
Bits (Difficulty Target) A hash value that indicates the level of difficulty experienced in computing the 
cryptographic problem 
Nonce A nonce is an arbitrary number which is used only once in cryptographic 
communication. The nonce is part of the block header which is used by miners 
to solve the cryptographic problem 
Source: (Khan and Salah, 2018) 
As blocks are added to the chain, information from previous blocks is recorded and used to 
produce a specific parameter (i.e. previous block hash) which required in the block header of 
the next block to be added. As shown in Figure 2.1, an iterative sequence of blocks is created 
as the chain grows which depicts a typical design structure of a blockchain showing chained 
blocks with header and body fields. 
Figure 2.1: Design structure of a Blockchain 
 
Source: (Khan and Salah, 2018) 
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2.3.2 Transaction lifecycle within the Bitcoin network 
The detailed structure of a blockchain and nature to which blocks are added to the chain is 
reflective of the procedures undergone to add information to the.network. In the context of 
Bitcoin network, the record of confirmed transactions is kept in several chained blocks and 
details of these transactions are available in the respective blocks that they were added to. As 
a result, the structure of blocks and their chain is instrumental to the transaction lifecycle. 
 
Table 2.2: Transaction lifecycle on the Bitcoin network 
Process  Description 
1) Transaction 
initiation 
Two parties, A and B, decide to exchange a unit of value (digital currency or a 
digital representation of some other asset) and initiate the transaction. 
2) Block The transaction is packaged with other pending transactions thereby creating a 
“block.” The block is sent to the blockchain system’s network of participating 
nodes. 
3) Hashing Each block of transactions is time-stamped with a cryptographic hash. Each block 
also contains a reference to the previous block’s hash, thus creating a “chain” of 
records that cannot be falsified except by convincing participating nodes that the 
tampered data in one block and in all prior blocks is true. 
4) Verification A special category of participating nodes called “miners” evaluate the transactions 
and through a pre-determined verification procedure determine validity of the 
pending transactions in the block. 
5) Execution The unit of value moves from the account of party A to the account of party B. 
Source: (Khan and Salah, 2018) 
Table 2.2 shows the sequence of steps within the transaction lifecycle of the Bitcoin network. 
First, the sender requests a transaction message that contains the transaction details 
(payment instructions and public key address of the recipient) and which is encrypted using 
hashing functions. The encrypted form is broadcasted to all nodes in the network and bundled 
with other transaction messages propagated in the network. Participating nodes verify the 
transaction against the POW consensus protocol and validated transactions are combined 
into a new data block and locked together with cryptographic hashes. The new data block is 
added to the existing blockchain and the transaction is considered as complete. 
 
2.3.3 Mining  
Mining is a process of generating proof of work schemes that provide consensual proof over 
the state of transaction records. An integral part of mining involves nodes in the network using 
their computational power to validate transactions by competing in a race to solve 
cryptographic problems (based on the SHA-256 algorithm) imposed by the protocol. In the 
same way, Böhme, et al., (2015) asserts that the act of miners presenting computational 
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solutions translates to a consensus scheme for which miners effectively vote upon the correct 
state of the ledger; verifying and chronologically sequencing transactions on the blockchain. 
The following steps indicate how concepts within the PoW protocol is implemented within the 
transaction lifecycle and subsequently achieve network consensus to update the blockchain 
with new transactions. It follows the process of: 
2.3.3.1 Transaction Initiation 
The originator (sender) of transaction is confirmed to be in ownership of Bitcoins being 
transferred by using their private key to encrypt the pending transaction instructions and 
broadcast the encryption details over the network. This creates a digital signature that provides 
proof of the possession of funds being transferred and ensures that accurate payment 
instructions between transacting parties are securely broadcasted over the network. 
 
2.3.3.2 Blocking 
Miners combine transactions by transcribing them into a secure record.  This record 
represents a queue of pending transactions broadcast over the network which are awaiting 
the stage of verification within the PoW protocol. 
 
2.3.3.3 Hashing  
The Bitcoin protocol requires that miners combine four inputs and enter them into a SHA-256 
hash function by including the following: a reference to the previous block (hash value of the 
previous block); details of the proposed block of pending transactions (namely Merkle root 
hash); and the nonce. The process is two-fold: inputting the parameters of the proposed block 
into a hash function to produce a hash value called a digest; and subsequently combining the 
input of the digest, hash value of the last block and with a nonce to produce a hash of the 
proposed block. 
 
2.3.3.4 Verification   
Miners determine the validity of pending transactions using the criteria of the target value 
specified in the bits field; this is a hash value that indicates the level of difficulty experienced 
in computing the cryptographic problem. To solve the cryptographic problem, miners conduct 
a brute-force search which involves combining multiple permutations of the nonce with hash 
value of the last block and digest to produce a unique hash value which is below the target 
value.  When a miner solves the cryptographic problem, the solution is broadcasted over the 
network to prove the authenticity of transactions in the block. The other nodes on the network 
can verify that the creator of the block has solved the proof of work as the nonce is the part of 
the broadcasted block that will eventually be updated on the blockchain (Kaushal, 2016b).      
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Once validated and timestamped, the block is added to the current chain. Nodes express their 
acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in the chain, using the hash of 
the accepted block as the previous block hash.  
 
2.3.3.5 Key features of the PoW system 
The Bitcoin system comprises of several features within the PoW protocol that ensure a 
deterministic outcome will prevail in a network of distrustful parties. In order to process and 
perform valid transactions over the network, protocol displays the following: 
1) Network parameters such as the hash rate—a measure of the computing power of the 
Bitcoin network—determines the difficulty (target value) of the cryptographic problem. 
The target value is inversely proportional to the difficulty of generating a block and 
henceforth, the network adjusts the target value in order to keep the rate of generating 
blocks consistent. 
2) The protocol requires that the proposed block contains the previous hash value within 
the block header. This ensures the order of blocks with an audit trail that traces the 
current block to the genesis block, which is essential to verifying and chronologically 
sequencing transactions on the blockchain.  
3) In order to incentivise nodes into contributing their computing power within the 
consensus process, any miners participating in the network are rewarded when they 
are the first node to solve the cryptographic problem and get their block added to the 
current chain. These rewards are provided in the form of bitcoins generated by the 
system and optional transaction fees that are included when a sender seeks to speed 
up the transaction (Bhaskar and Chuen, 2015; Böhme et al., 2016). 
4) The PoW is an objective protocol: nodes can independently arrive at the same current 
state as the rest of the network based solely on protocol rules. In the case of 
adversarial environment, the protocol will ensure that the network will add a block to 
the majority chain, as it has higher cumulative computational difficulty. When a chain 
splits, miners should always choose the longest chain since it has the most work done. 
Miners can work on multiple chains if they wish to but to the detriment of dividing their 
computational power. 
These key functions are implemented in distributed ledgers to ensure that a single 
authoritative state of the data record is shared across the entire network. However, there are 
eventualities that result in the branching of the blockchain into multiple blockchains when 
multiple nodes confirm a block in the same instant; a condition termed as “forking”. Due to the 
unresolved state of consensus on the network, the blockchain diverges into multiple chains 
with several blocks being formed from the same block of transactions. 
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These circumstances represent different states of ledger concurrently operating on the 
network, henceforth, creating a problem where no consensual view of the state of the ledger 
is shared among participants in the network. This inconsistency in the blockchain is resolved 
by the consensus mechanism identifying the branch with the highest computational effort 
applied to it (in other words longest blockchain) and instructing nodes to build upon it. 
Subsequently, alternative chains will be rendered invalid and transactions in those blocks 
unconfirmed. The longest transaction history, called the blockchain, is considered 
authoritative, and will be used by all nodes as a basis for adding additional transaction blocks. 
 
Gervais, Karame, Wüst, Glykantzis, Ritzdorf and Capkun (2016) argues that the fundamentals 
to the security model of the PoW protocol requires that no individual node or collective entity 
gain more than 50% of the computational power to control the system by sustaining the longest 
chain. However, the Bitcoin’s PoW scheme is vulnerable to these “51% attacks”, when nodes 
collude to gain 51% of the mining power; increasing the likelihood of “double spending” and 
selfish mining (Bentov, 2014:3). Double spending is when two or more transactions attempt to 
transfer the same Bitcoins multiple times. The system addresses this problem by using a 
network timestamp that is included into each block header of the ongoing chain. By indexing 
the order of transactions using a timestamp, the protocol can verify that as an outcome of the 
transaction, the sender would not be able to present itself as being in possession of the funds 
any more (Kaushal, 2016b). 
 
A seminal paper by (Eyal and Sirer, 2014), shows evidence that miners form pools in order to 
decrease the variance of their income rate of rewards from the mining process. The strategy 
of selfish mining involves a pool of miners delaying the broadcast of PoW solutions of blocks, 
thereby intentionally forking the chain. The honest nodes continue to mine on the public chain, 
while the pool mines on its own private branch. If the pool discovers more blocks, it develops 
a longer lead on the public chain, and continues to keep these new blocks private. When the 
public branch approaches the pool’s private branch in length, the selfish miners reveal blocks 
from their private chain to the public. 
 
Since the protocol only rewards miners that contribute to the majority chain--as it has higher 
cumulative computational difficulty—honest miners waste their computational resources and 
reduce the likelihood of acquiring income from mining. By aggregating their computational 
power, miners effectively have control of the network and colluding miners earn 
disproportionate benefits by deviating from the protocol. Honest miners are incentivised to join 
mining pools, therefore centralising the function of mining on the network, which is antithetical 
to the fundamentals of blockchain technology. 
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2.4 Types of Blockchains  
In an environment such as financial industry, the application of distributed ledgers that support 
financial systems needs to be optimised in such a way that its attributes meet the requirements 
of different users, miners, developers and other participants that exist in that ecosytem. A 
technology platform such a blockchain can be developed into different implementations of 
varying attributes: the consensus process, transaction throughput, security and degree of 
centralisation. 
 
Implementation of blockchains can be classified into three types: public (permission-less), 
private (permissioned) and consortium. In a public blockchain, anyone can join the network, 
allowing participants to read, write and verify transactions. Data is validated by every 
participant in the network, where trust is established among participants through a predefined 
consensus mechanism. In a private blockchain, a set of participants are elected to grant 
permissions to the whole network on who can read, write or verify transactions. Therefore, 
read-access privileges are limited and configurable to a specific category of network 
participants while write permissions are kept centralised to a single authority. Consortium 
blockchains are a hybrid of private and public blockchains where the consensus process is 
controlled by a pre-selected set of users as with private blockchain, however, they possess a 
degree of security implementations that are inherent to public blockchains. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.3, there are significant distinctions regarding the consensus 
process, transaction throughput, security and degree of centralisation that define different 
types of blockchain. Public blockchains are designed to be fully decentralized, with no one 
individual or entity controlling which transactions are recorded in the blockchain or the order 
in which they are processed. Private blockchains are valuable for enterprises who want to 
collaborate and share data, but do not want their sensitive business data visible on a public 
blockchain. However, consortium blockchains are governed by a group rather than a single 
entity allowing a collaborative model that offers the best use cases from the benefits of 
blockchain. 
 
 21 
 
Table 2.3: Characteristics distinguishing public blockchains to private blockchains 
 Permission-less (Public) Permissioned (private) 
Central party No central owner or administrator Has some degree of external 
administration or control 
Access Anyone can join Only pre-selected participants can join 
the network 
Level of Trust Network members are not required to 
trust each other 
Higher degree of trust among members 
required (as collaboration among 
members 
could alter the ledger) 
Openness Ledger is open & transparent – shared 
between all network members 
Different degrees of openness and 
transparency of the ledger are possible 
Security Security through wide distribution in a 
large-scale network 
Security through access control 
combined with DLT in smaller scale 
networks 
Speed Slower transaction processing restricts 
transaction volume 
Faster transaction processing allows for 
higher transaction volume 
Identity User identity anonymous or protected by 
pseudonyms 
Identity verification typically required by 
owner/administrator 
Consensus Difficult proof-of-work required as 
consensus mechanism 
Variety of consensus mechanisms 
possible (typically less difficult & less 
costly than proof-of-work in permission-
less blockchains) 
Asset Typically: native cryptocurrencies. But 
implementations are possible where a 
token is used which can represent any 
asset. 
Any asset 
Legal ownership Legal concerns over lack of ownership as 
no legal entity owns or controls the ledger 
Greater legal clarity over ownership as 
owner/administrator is typically a legal 
entity 
Examples Bitcoin, Ethereum Ripple, Hyperledger Fabric 
 
Source: (Natarajan, et al., 2017) 
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2.5 The influence of cryptocurrencies on the financial industry 
This section provides a primer on how developing different consensus models implemented 
on cryptocurrencies has led to further opportunities for gains in efficiency, trust and data 
reconciliation within financial infrastructures. The following section investigates the cases of 
Ethereum’s Proof-of-Stake (PoS) and Ripple’s InterLedger protocol; their impact in developing 
financial platforms for smart contracts, payment systems and asset management.  
 
2.5.1 Case study of Proof-of-Stake mechanism: Ethereum 
Ethereum (market symbol: ETH) represents a development in DLT solutions that allow 
stakeholders in the ecosystem to create decentralised applications (dApps) and smart 
contracts that govern and automate transactions in a distributed ledger platform. The 
application of these distributed ledger services allows participants to automate internal and 
external processes of financial services beyond payment processing in the transaction 
lifecycle. The foundation layer of its blockchain integrates a Turing-complete programming 
language (i.e. Ethereum Virtual Machine) that allows participants to create blockchain 
applications with predefined operations, with their own arbitrary rules for ownership, 
transaction formats and state transition functions. 
 
From earlier implementations, operating public blockchains using the PoW consensus 
algorithm presented trade-offs; as the hash rate increased in difficulty, more computational 
power was being added to the network. Its mechanism ensures distributed consensus and 
network vitality by aggregating computational power over a decentralised network (Buterin 
and Griffith, 2017). Therefore, securing the blockchain became resource-intensive considering 
the high energy consumption and hardware costs needed to mine blocks (Eyal and Sirer, 
2014). In the same way, the PoW mechanism was prone to the risk of centralisation due to 
limitations for all network participants (i.e. mining pools) to contribute in block generation 
through the prevalence of selfish mining (Eyal, 2017).  
 
Considering these concerns, to ensure that all nodes in the network share a consistent view 
on a common distributed ledger, the Ethereum foundation proposed an alternative protocol to 
reach distributed agreement known as the Proof-Of-Stake (PoS) mechanism. The PoS 
scheme was introduced to address the drawbacks of the PoW mechanism by implementing 
an economic consensus approach that secures consensus and validates blocks depending 
on a validator's economic stake in the network. PoW secures the blockchain by imposing 
insurmountable costs on gaining majority control of the network while PoS uses the potential 
loss of economic value to secure the network (Buterin and Griffith, 2017). 
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This consensus protocol involves the use of validators willing to stake a required amount of 
native cryptocurrency (such as Ether) issued on the platform and by placing a ‘bonding’ 
transaction on the network. By purchasing the native cryptocurrency, the validator is effectively 
gaining influence towards becoming a consensus-forming node via block production. All 
consensus-forming nodes are expected to validate every transaction and changes to a set of 
nodes are validated and finalised by the consensus. Subsequently, there is an evaluation 
process for bonding and returning stake that is decided by the consensus protocol. 
 
Through a pseudorandom process, the PoS algorithm awards a group of validators—by 
rotating process—privileges of writing new blocks in the blockchain. Their eligibility is 
contingent on the share of stake they hold in the native cryptocurrency. A validator node holds 
a fraction of the aggregated stake in circulation with a proportional likelihood of creating a new 
block by the ratio of their stake to the total stake available. As chains grow, validators are 
incentivised to validate the chains that have the largest stake in their blockchain state, as well 
as to validate chains that hold pooled cryptocurrency funds used as stake from preceding 
blocks within the chain. 
 
In accordance to the protocol, PoS offers no block rewards and only transaction fees are 
available as compensation for validating transactions; a countermeasure against negative 
effects derived from competitive mining schemes (Buterin and Griffith, 2017). This proof of 
concept determines the amount of rewards received by the validators mainly through the 
protocol’s control over security deposits (or stake). The protocol aims to guarantee the 
forfeiture of security deposits for nodes exhibiting byzantine behaviour: encouraging malicious 
attacks against network consensus.  
 
As more blocks are validated, these validators are awarded a portion of the transaction fees 
that were included in each transaction of the block produced. In the instance where a validator 
has put a stake on valid transactions, they are obligated to reclaim their stake if required and 
their compensatory reward after a certain time interval or if they remove themselves from the 
validator pool. The protocol sets a specific lifetime for the security deposit on the network to 
ensure a fair ecosystem that incentivises the entry of validator nodes. Unlike the PoW scheme, 
the PoS protocol uses a unique game-theoretic design in order to create disincentives for 
network centralisation. If a validator commits to an invalid transaction execution, the 
consensus protocol forfeits their stake and revokes their privileges in participating in the 
network’s consensus. This prevents dishonest validators from manipulating the consensus 
protocol, as such actions will attract significant economic penalties. Under such 
circumstances, malicious participants complicit in the attempt to confirm any conflicting block 
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or state are faced with the dilemma of incurring a disproportionate amount of in-protocol 
penalties relative to the rewards they received. In the same context, the use of economic 
penalties makes various forms of 51% attacks expensive to carry out, thus diminishing the 
potential economies of scale to mining carried out by validator pools. 
 
Therefore, PoS employs a less energy intensive process that reduces operational costs and 
capital investment required to maintain the blockchain relative to the PoW implementation 
(Malone and O’Dwyer, 2014). With proof of stake, energy consumption is guided towards 
powering blockchain’s core software and processing the cryptographic calculations involved 
in validating whether a miner owns the cryptocurrency they have staked or not. Therefore, 
PoS creates an environment that encourages more people to participate in the mining process 
and, because the investment needed to mine transactions is significantly smaller, the reward 
needed to compensate miners is also reduced (lower transaction fees). This process secures 
the network and gradually produces new coins over time without consuming significant 
computational power. 
 
2.5.1.1 Challenges  
Harwick (2016) suggests that uncertainty exists over the marginal benefit of mining which is 
dependent on the expectations influencing future prices. In a PoS ecosystem, the value of the 
currency corresponds to the costs of offering stake required to become a validating node. This 
dynamic behaviour ensures that the costs of malicious attacks increase with the value of the 
underlying currency, which guarantees the reliability of the consensus protocol. However, 
locking up cryptocurrency stake to acquire validation privileges creates economic 
inefficiencies in the network as opportunity costs emerge from liquidity risks and participants 
sacrificing their option to invest elsewhere. Realised payoff of mining blocks on the network 
varies over the operational costs, creating speculation about the marginal benefit of the 
validation process. 
 
Likewise, PoS systems lacking a robust proof of concept are susceptible to nothing-at-stake 
problems as well as long-range attacks and coin age accumulation attacks. Since PoS 
invalidates the incentive model of PoW, a problem arises when validators have no downside 
risk (intrinsic cost) to staking on multiple blockchains when forks occur. In the case of a fork, 
validators are inclined to use their ability to validate transactions in order to amplify their hold 
on the network by blocking the participation of other stakeholders and mine on every fork, so 
that the miner gets their reward no matter which fork wins (Li, Andreina, Bohli and Karame, 
2017). This is the underlying premise of the nothing-at-stake argument. However, this problem 
 25 
 
can be addressed by adding punitive measures within the consensus protocol for voting more 
than once and on multiple chains. 
 
With long range attacks, an attacker possessing enough computational power can attempt to 
build an alternative blockchain starting from the very first block due to lack of the protocol 
limiting the maximum allowed depth of a branching point. Coin age accumulation attacks 
present a scenario where a group of successful stakeholders gain enough share of stake over 
time to effectively control the network, becoming the sole recipient of the rewards of the block 
validation process. Subsequently, the value of tokens on this network are determined by the 
authority participants have in the controlling stakeholder; centralising authority over the 
network to validators with the greatest stake hold.  
 
2.5.1.2 Opportunities 
Ethereum is a protocol that uses underlying blockchain technology to create a platform for 
developers—one that hosts decentralised applications based on smart contracts. Rosner and 
Kang (2016:662) reason that applications of such smart contracts in conjunction with 
blockchain technology could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs attributable to cross-border 
payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by between $15-20 billion USD per 
annum by 2022. Moreover, the use of decentralised applications could increase the efficiency, 
trust and transparency for actors in financial ecosystems (Rosner and Kang 2016:662). 
 
The potential to Ethereum’s value proposition lies within its increased utility and ability to 
eventually eliminate the involvement of financial institutions and automate contractual 
obligations by leveraging the application of smart contracts. Users can send transactions to 
the Ethereum network in order to:  
1) create new contracts;  
2) invoke a function of a contract;  
3) transfer ether to contracts or to other users.  
All the transactions sent by users, called external transactions, are recorded on a public, 
append-only data structure. Upon receiving an external transaction, a contract can initiate 
some internal transactions, which are not explicitly recorded on the blockchain (or state 
machine), but still have effects on the balance of users and of other contracts (Bartoletti, Carta, 
Cimoli and Saia, 2017). Voshmigir (2017) reaffirms that the combination of governance rules 
of the consensus protocol and the application of smart contracts address two problems of 
traditional top-down governance structures: high transaction costs of coordination; and 
information asymmetries due to principal-agent issues.  
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2.5.2 Case study of InterLedger Protocol mechanism: Ripple 
Ripple (market symbol: XRP) is a distributed, real-time payment protocol for anything of value 
which is fundamentally different from the centralised authority of existing payment systems. 
This platform functions as a shared permission-less ledger that integrates a real-time gross 
settlement system, a currency exchange and a remittance network within a blockchain 
ecosystem.  
 
Currently, payment processes across countries involve multiple financial intermediaries that 
take part in facilitating transaction settlement. These traditional systems have become 
inconvenient, costly and time consuming for participants that demand greater performance 
within modern payment infrastructures. A solution to these problems is the use of Ripple as a 
decentralised ledger technology that reduces the cost of transferring assets of value across 
multiple financial infrastructures (Armknecht, Karame, Mandal, Youssef and Zenner, 2015). 
Ripple’s blockchain creates and enables real-time settlement networks by using a payment 
protocol that allows different classes of network participants to interact with each other, 
exchange value and maintain the replicated state of the ledger. 
 
The Ripple protocol facilitates exchange through a distributed settlement mechanism. Rosner 
and Kang (2016:658) provides an explanation of the Ripple network as follows: 
In distributed settlement, a ledger is distributed among, and algorithmically updated 
by, the collective actions of Ripple users rather than a central party. This is a public—
as opposed to a private or central bank—ledger because every Ripple user can see 
and update the ledger. The public ledger records every single transaction processed 
through the Ripple protocol and keeps track of all Ripple users’ balances. It is a publicly 
maintained record-keeping mechanism. While the correspondent-banking system 
requires each financial institution in the payment chain to update its individual ledger, 
the collective users of Ripple update a single, public ledger that represents every user’s 
balance, which enables the system to process a collection of fund transfers 
immediately. 
 
Activity within the Ripple network consists of the open-end participation of end-users, 
gateways and market makers. End-users are exchangers that generate transactions across 
the network and entrust gateways to reliably hold their balance (Baliga, 2017). Gateways 
function as financial intermediaries in the network that allow end-users to exchange 
currencies, assets or securities into balances and/or XRP that are transferable on the network. 
Market makers provide the required liquidity to facilitate payment transactions and settle 
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trades. Additionally, market makers increase network interconnectivity by maintaining 
accounts with multiple gateways and varied things of value. 
 
Furthermore, the Ripple payment protocol relies on a path finding algorithm that routes every 
transaction through the most suitable payment path from source to receiver, in other words 
the cheapest price/path to facilitate the transaction. This procedure allows market makers to 
not only provide liquidity, but to actively compete for spreads (Rosner and Kang, 2016). XRP 
is the native cryptocurrency on the Ripple network that functions as a key enabler of exchange. 
XRP is used to pay transaction fees and hold reserve requirements that enable users to 
generate transactions and create trust lines. A trust line represents the level of a user’s 
willingness to be exposed to a gateway’s counterparty risk. The user can set a quantitative 
limit on their level of trust for a gateway. If a payment goes over the user’s set trust limit, then 
the network will not allow the execution of the payment. 
 
Moreover, XRP acts as a currency of last resort, allowing counterparties that bridge any 
ask/bid prices for assets, currencies or things of value traded on the network. Since anything 
of value is XRP denominated at all gateways, users can convert anything to XRP, transfer the 
XRP via trust lines and covert it to any desired asset of value. Rosner and Kang (2016) 
describes XRP as Ripple’s countermeasure to denial of service attacks and because XRP is 
destroyed on generating every transaction (as a transaction fee), it is expensive for attackers 
to overload the network. 
 
Ripple achieves consensus using a variation of the federated byzantine fault tolerance scheme 
that validates transactions using a voting process. In the Ripple network, all participants can 
contribute to the validation process by broadcasting proposals as part of the consensus 
process. Each validating node is required to define a Unique Node List (UNL), a group of other 
users that it trusts as validating nodes. UNLs are consensus subnetworks of collective trust 
that exist within the large network and allow each validator to determine the nodes whose 
validation proposal they will consider. This ensures that overlapping networks of UNLs will 
produce an agreeable and coherent state of the transaction ledger (Seibold and Samman, 
2016). 
 
With the propagation of transactions on the network, the protocol timestamps every 
transaction that senders submit to the network with a digital signature, a modified public key 
signature scheme. Validating nodes vote to verify the authenticity of a transaction, approving 
or rejecting the validity of a transaction. Thereafter, proposals are published on the network 
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and the proposed changes approved by least 50% of the consensus pool are packaged into 
a new proposal which is published on the network. 
 
This process is re-iterated with vote requirements increasing to 60%,70% and 80% after which 
the protocol validates the changes and alerts the network that the current ledger state 
(updated ledger), is “closed” and becomes the last-closed ledger. A “continuous ledger close” 
ensures that once consensus is reached, any node that receives new transactions reinitiates 
the consensus process for the next ledger close immediately. Each round of consensus 
reduces disagreement, until the supermajority (80%) is reached. Consequently, this protocol 
ensures that disputed transactions are discarded from proposals while widely accepted 
transactions are included. 
 
2.5.2.1 Challenges 
In order to ensure interoperability, operational resilience and efficiencies in a global exchange 
network, multi-stakeholder platforms such as Ripple require entities to share data, standards, 
system protocols, governance models and more. For some participants in this ecosystem, 
sharing proprietary information goes against business interests. Therefore, there is need for 
such platforms to be governed to ensure that their functionality aligns with business intentions 
and legal requirements; enabling functionalities for participants to address different 
transactions in different asset classes and different regulatory and business requirements 
(ISSA, 2018). 
 
Ripple improves the underlying settlement infrastructure of global-payment systems and 
functions only to complement existing structures. However, for Ripple’s network to develop 
further, there is need for industry collaboration with banks, payment processors, money 
transmitters, and other financial services institutions for network effects to be realised (Rosner 
and Kang, 2016). 
 
2.5.2.2 Opportunities 
The current framework for cross-border transactions is one that involves several processes 
and checks that slow down the transactions and even make them quite expensive. The core 
value proposition of Ripple depends on its financial use in enabling global financial settlement 
systems for back-end financial service providers (banks and payments networks) by reducing 
the cost and time of settlement, and optimising high volume, low value global transactions. 
Additionally, it is designed to facilitate end-to-end payment services for financial institutions 
with legal obligations that impose risk and privacy requirements, Anti-Money Laundering 
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(AML) policies and Know Your Customer (KYC) compliances regulated through legal and 
corporate finance structures. Industry collaboration with financial institutions such as 
Santander, ReiseBank, UniCredit and Royal Bank of Canada indicate the potential of Ripple 
global network in addressing the demand for real-time, high volume, low value global 
payments (Elison, 2016). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
As seen, varying implementations of blockchain designs that characterise cryptocurrencies 
signify the varying degrees of immutability, transparency and autonomy that business use-
cases call for. Table 2.4 highlights the key distinctions of leading cryptocurrencies regarding 
their implementation of consensus algorithms, network access and encryption mechanisms. 
To that end, beyond cryptocurrencies, applications of blockchain technology have the 
propensity to transform industry practices and interactions in financial services. 
 
As blockchain adoption ramps up, we see four transitions driving the technology’s maturity. 
These are, transitioning from private to public networks to create an open system for all users; 
shifting from synchronisation to tokenisation to improve accuracy and reduce risk; moving from 
cryptocurrency to tokenised fiat currency to transfer value on public networks; and shifting 
from parallel separate systems to integration with laws and regulation from central banks and 
governments. With these developments, blockchain could become fully operationalised into 
enterprises, leading to a surge in applications across industries. 
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Table 2.4: Differences within the application of blockchain technology on cryptocurrencies 
Feature Attribute Bitcoin 
(Digital cash) 
Ripple 
(Inter-bank 
Remittances) 
Ethereum 
(dApps) 
Open Membership Permissioned Vs 
Permissionless 
Permissionless Permissioned Permissionless 
No transaction, once 
verified, can be 
changed by any party 
Consensus 
Algorithm 
PoW (custom-made) 
BFT consensus 
PoW, PoS 
Prevention of asset 
double-spending 
Business logic can self-
execute with the 
assurance that the 
terms cannot be 
altered by any party 
without agreement 
from stakeholders 
Smart Contracts 
support 
Very limited 
(stack-based 
scripting 
language) 
None Solidity domain 
specific language 
(DSL) Turing-
complete 
Transaction execution 
revolves around a 
blockchain-specific 
digital currency 
Native 
cryptocurrency 
BTC XRP ETH 
Transaction 
confidentiality 
Encryption, key-
distribution 
cryptographic 
mechanisms 
No No Smart contract 
level 
confidentiality 
Source: (Parthasarathy, 2017) 
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3. The Application of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Industry 
3.1 Introduction 
As different sectors of the financial industry have shown widespread interest in 
DLT/blockchain, there has been several use cases that benefited from the innovative method 
of storing and updating data within and between organisations through peer-to-peer 
networking. The utilisation of blockchain technology has opened opportunities for financial 
innovation, bringing attention to the role of DLT in providing functionalities for: 
1) Storage of digital records: the application of a secure, auditable and immutable 
record for storing digital identities of individuals, organisations, assets, titles and voting 
rights  
2) Exchange of digital assets: facilitating real-time, secure and peer-to-peer 
transactions that can be used to issue new assets and transfer ownership of assets 
without financial institutions and payment processors, thereafter, reducing clearing and 
settlement times and related costs. 
3) Recordation and execution of smart contracts: self-governing contracts that 
simplify and automate financial workflows and processes that define financial systems. 
Blockchain technology provides solutions to the insistent concerns of contemporary financial 
applications and systems that demand trust in central points of control. The integration of such 
functionalities within the financial industry opens potential for a decentralised autonomous 
environment that enables automated governance systems to formalise multilateral 
interactions. Consequently, transacting parties can leverage these systems for transferring, 
verifying and validating information kept on such platforms. 
 
Table 3.1 provides a technical overview of functions and characteristics that differentiate 
blockchain implementations relative to the legacy systems underlying financial infrastructure. 
In contrast to the current IT systems and database structures implemented in financial 
systems, DLTs such as blockchain distinguish themselves by providing robustness, system 
efficiency and scalability without the need for intervention. This departure reflects a major 
paradigm shift from the role of centralised systems and indicates the potential disruption of 
industry practices in the financial services ecosystem. 
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Table 3.1: Dichotomy of financial technology (Blockchain vs Legacy systems) 
Characteristic  Blockchain Legacy Systems  
Data ownership 
 
Privacy and Security 
 
Access control 
 
Trust 
Maintained through 
cryptographic key and native 
cryptographic algorithms 
 
Cryptographic authentication 
Inherently identical for all 
permissioned nodes 
 
Native via immutable records 
Established via central 
authority 
 
Configuring each row 
based on enforcement by 
a central authority 
 
Centrally administered 
Established via central 
authority 
Data quality 
 
Database validity 
 
Data propagation 
Immutable records with 
automatic conflict resolution 
through consensus for 
transactions 
 
Continuous 
 
Quick propagation across all 
network nodes 
Complex conflict 
resolution processes 
requiring manual 
intervention 
 
Provided only for single 
instances in time 
 
Managed through multi-
version currency control 
and through custom 
synchronisation processes 
Enforce data 
transformations 
 
Concurrency and 
synchronisation 
 
Reliability and 
availability  
 
Stored procedures 
 
Transaction creation 
 
Fraudulent/Malicious 
Changes 
Built into data layer logic 
 
Consensus yields identical 
copies 
 
Peer to peer networking for 
distributed data replication 
across all nodes 
 
Smart contracts 
 
Available to all permissioned 
parties 
 
Immutability through reliance 
on previous blocks 
None 
 
Involves complex 
checking between central 
database and user’s 
database to ensure 
agreement 
 
Potential single point of 
failure 
 
Not available 
 
Managed via central 
authority 
 
Not available where 
current keys and check 
constraints remain 
insufficient 
 
Source: International Finance Corporation (2017) 
Table 3.2 highlights of some of the startups, initiative and industry enablers that are leveraging 
blockchain technology to renovate business models and value chains within the financial 
services sector. In many fields of the financial industry, entities have been integrating 
technological solutions within the back-end processes and complex IT legacy systems that 
govern existing infrastructures. At an operational level, adopting DLT/Blockchain solutions 
challenges the established systems, processes and architectures by disrupting industry 
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practices and redefining workflow optimisation, information exchange, data storage, 
networking and security (Rand Europe, 2017). 
 
Table 3.2: Examples of real-world applications of blockchain technology 
Organisation  Stakeholders Business Innovation  
R3CEV Financial Services Initiative by a consortium of banks to collaborate on DLT 
development for financial services, including industry standards 
Hyperledger DLT/Blockchain 
developers and users 
in all sectors 
Open source collaborative effort hosted by Linux Foundation to 
advance cross-industry blockchain technologies through shared 
technical frameworks and infrastructure 
Scorechain Businesses in the 
financial sector 
Platform providing analytical and 
monitoring tools for regulatory compliance 
of businesses using blockchain technology 
in the financial industry 
Civic  Financial regulation 
authorities  
An identity management platform that leverages DLT to 
manage and act as a repository for digital identities. As a tool 
for identity verification, the platform simplifies compliance duties 
for individuals and organisation to fulfil their KYC requirements  
Interledger 
Protocol 
Organisations 
involved in ledger-
based payments 
Open-source protocol for sending and receiving money 
between ledgers 
Chain Open 
Standard 
Organisations 
involved in digitised 
asset transfers 
Open-source protocol for ledger design for the 
financial services sector 
Coinpris-m  End-users / 
organisations 
representing end-
user interests and 
rights 
Platform providing tools to identify and 
track transactions in cryptocurrencies 
 
Source: (Rand Europe, 2017) 
Several applications of DLT in the financial sector have played a significant role in the diffusion 
of blockchain technology across different industries, especially in the related sectors of 
regulatory compliance, land registry and governance. As a result, the technology presents an 
opportunity for vertical integration and redesign of current processes in those sectors. 
Henceforth, Chapter 3 focuses upon the future prospects of businesses, initiatives and start-
ups using blockchain technology: that encorage its adoption; facilitate the development of 
standards; enable cross-industry collaboration that improves its value proposition within 
business model; and expand the range of applications in the industry. 
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3.2 Innovative Applications of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Industry 
3.2.1 Smart Contracts 
FSPs are continuously confronted with the challenges of improving automated processes that 
facilitate financial contracts. In the context of centralised financial ecosystems, mainstream 
FSPs are often prone to the systemic issues of obsolete and inefficient internal processes, 
settlement delays, fraud, excessive overhead costs and concentrated risk factors. Moreover, 
the complexity of internal services and processes required in the financial service industry 
warrant the need to enhance the approach to financial contracting and create efficiencies. 
Bankers, insurers and market players have recently lent themselves to experimenting with the 
digitisation of financial contracts and conceptualisation of products and services that automate 
the execution of certain provisions specified within financial contracts. 
 
Earlier versions of financial contracts that sought to automate the performance of their 
obligations can be traced from the conception of Ricardian contracts (Grigg, 2004). A 
Ricardian contract includes a legal agreement and a protocol that integrates the agreement 
securely within a digital infrastructure, while offering the security of cryptographic signatures 
(Grigg, 2004). These contracts enable a legal contract to be interpreted digitally without losing 
the validity and enforceability of agreements made between acting parties. In tandem with the 
development of DLTs, the conceptualisation of smart contracts became apparent with 
innovations that created efficiencies when financial contracts where translated into digital 
form. 
 
The potential of blockchain technology and the application of smart contracts culminated to 
the possibility of realising reduced operational costs and introduced new business models that 
address the problem of fragmented and inefficient financial processes. As a corollary, the 
application of smart contracts leveraging blockchain platforms offered a high degree of 
immutability and security; known attributes of blockchain technology. The use of smart 
contracts guarantees that by automating aspects of the performance of contractual 
agreements, specified tasks can be automatically, autonomously, and securely executed. 
 
KPMG (2017) defines smart contracts as standardised, fully-automated and autonomous 
financial instruments that facilitate, verify and enforce attributes of a contract according to 
predetermined scenarios. Applying blockchain technology enables the production of smart 
contracts with full automation in determining and enforcing contractual obligations while 
minimising the occurrence of malicious and accidental outcomes. In distributed ledger, smart 
contracts eliminate the need for a trusted intermediary, providing a trust less system for 
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conducting transactions. By reducing the risk of counterparty default, fraud and lowering the 
costs of arbitration and enforcement, smart contracts create liquidity and other contracting 
opportunities that value trust less systems. 
 
Smart contracts interact with the external world to incorporate outside information into their 
blockchain and securely track conditional parameters that activate contractual enforcement 
(Surujnath, 2017). They carry out this function by utilising the key properties of 
programmability, multi-signature authentication escrow capability and oracle inputs 
(Capgemini, 2016). 
 
Programmability in the context of contractual write ups specifies and defines business logic 
codified into  executable software. It functions as a digital contract that automatically enforces 
relative obligations and requirements when conditional parameters are met over a network. 
Multi-signature escrow allows for two or more parties to enter into an agreement and  approves 
the execution of a transaction when monitored securely by a signatory party that arbitrates the 
contract. This is a crucial element for escrowing funds that are associated with processes 
defined by a smart contract; they can be unlocked under conditions acceptable to contracting 
parties namely programmed logic. 
 
Smart contracts interact with oracles (such as Schellingcoin)—sources of information required 
by smart contracts to perform the function of data-input. To determine the execution of 
contractual agreements, smart contracts acquire real-world data provided by oracles, run this 
input through programmed logic and initiate processes when pre-defined conditions relating 
to the information are met. 
 
A contentious issue about smart contracts is whether to designate them as legally binding 
instruments that describe valid and enforceable terms of agreement or assign them as informal 
agreements. The implications of digitising financial contracts draw an element of ambiguity 
over the role of smart contracts based on existing legal standards and documentation that 
govern financial contracts. The nature of smart contracts suggests that these instruments are 
segmented between the legal aspect of their agreements and contract code. In this space, 
legal contracts describe contractual clauses that are designed to execute or bring certain 
tasks/outcomes when pre-defined conditions are met. Smart contract code represents an 
element of the legal contract that codifies and automates the terms of agreement embedded 
within the programmed logic. This distinction creates ambiguity over the relationship between 
these elements and whether both instances deserve legally enforceable rights or not (ISDA, 
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2017). Moreover, this notion extends to question whether smart contract code satisfies the 
requirements that designate them as legal contracts. 
 
An interesting use-case of smart contracts in DLT is the application of smart contracts in the 
derivatives market. DLT innovation allows market participants to replace central 
counterparties that handle processes for clearing and managing exchange-traded derivatives. 
Surujnath (2017) suggests that using smart contracts eliminates the redundancy of 
counterparties that independently manage the recording, verification and execution of 
applicable trades and other lifecycle events. The application of blockchain technology 
supported by smart contracts assume the function undertaken by central counterparties by 
valuing contracts, calculating initial and variation margins, facilitating custody of collateral, 
handling novation and netting, and managing closeout. Moreover, enabling DAOs that use 
smart contracts allows participants to evaluate their trade positions through real-time exposure 
monitoring. 
 
Start-ups like DPactum and Symbiont are fundamentally reshaping the derivatives market by 
integrating technology that reduces operational risks and streamlines processes that automate 
the settlement of obligations ascribed to specific derivatives (Capgemini, 2016). Despite their 
potential to reorganise the industry, there is a limitation to the influence that blockchain 
technology can provide to alleviate the systemic risks inherent within the market. Derivatives 
are often created to curtail risks that involve transaction agreements, however, the specificity 
of their contractual terms often renders them illiquid and susceptible to counterparty default. 
As much as DLT disintermediates the derivatives market to create efficiencies across the 
value chain, central counterparties still contribute to the functionality of standardising and 
liquidating derivatives to reduce the risk of illiquidity and counterparty default (Capgemini, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, smart contracts may be difficult to develop and implement in situations that call 
for: 
3.2.1.1 Reversibility of transaction 
Smart contracts that work on distributed ledger systems are inadvertently irreversible. In the 
event of disputes or malicious outcomes transpiring from the execution of a smart contract, 
the lack of legal/regulatory precedent makes it difficult for concerned parties to seek resolution 
or arbiters that handle these situations. 
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3.2.1.2 Reliability of external data sources 
There are administrative costs involving the integration and governance of data feeds that 
interact with the blockchain ecosystem that supports smart contracts. The cost of monitoring 
the reliability of oracles must ensure that the occurrence of financial losses is avoided. 
 
3.2.1.3 Programming complex financial contracts  
Codifying non-operational clauses of a financial contract that are subjective and informally 
represented is a difficult part of expressing such terms into programmed logic. This represents 
a challenge to producing smart contracts that include a comprehensive form of the financial 
contracts created and legal implications that endorse them. 
 
In conclusion, this formative era of smart contracts and their adoption in the financial industry 
involves on-going collaborative effort by stakeholders to explore the fundamental 
characteristics of blockchain technologies and demonstrate their potential within markets. 
Likewise, the development of blockchain technology prompts the need for market participants 
to experiment with smart contracts and enhance the capabilities of achieving efficiencies 
idealised with their implementation. The application of smart contracts has the challenge of 
addressing the systemic issues of accounting for varying geographies, incompatible legal 
frameworks and managing the complexity of diverse financial contracts. A circumstance that 
reaffirms the necessity of financial technology in the management of market infrastructures. 
 
3.2.2 Token management: Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) 
Following the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, capital raising, and financing activities have 
been challenging endeavors in adverse financial environments where enterprises, startups 
and FSPs are faced with bureaucratic costs that impose restrictions on traditional equity-based 
funding schemes. Because of the overlapping regulatory control on processes involving the 
provision, allocation and deployment of financial capital, establishing alternative financial 
solutions to procuring financial capital has been a common objective for individual firms, 
consortiums and markets that continuously require funding to finance operations. The advent 
of blockchain technology and its convergence with the development of the crowdfunding 
industry has culminated in the creation of fund-raising schemes known as Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICO) or crypto-token sales. 
 
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) are unregulated means of crowdfunding; they enable every 
individual/company to easily purchase freely tradable crypto-tokens to raise funds.  ICOs are 
carried out on a distributed ledger/blockchain and offer various forms of crypto-tokens 
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purported to have inherent value such as cryptocurrencies, tokenised assets, tokenised 
platforms and tokens as shares. Launching ICOs using the blockchain platform increases 
project transparency, decreases investor risk and develops into an effective financing tool for 
lucrative blockchain projects. The purpose of an ICO is to raise funding from the public to 
develop a project or business proposals that are largely open source collaborations that 
contribute value back to the blockchain ecosystem at large. 
 
As an abstraction, crypto-tokens are like equity or ownership interests as they represent the 
process of converting rights to a financial asset into a digital token that functions as a system 
resource within a blockchain ecosystem. Initially, crypto-tokens where created as ways to 
incentivise, verify and maintain valuable open network participation by users, investors, and 
service providers that contribute bandwidth, storage and computational power. By enabling 
the development of financial service platforms layered on a blockchain infrastructure, crypto-
tokens reaffirm the intended attributes of transparency, self-binding, and accountability in an 
agreement between a digital token issuer and proprietor. 
 
Bhaskar et al. (2015) observes that crowdfunding platforms using cryptocurrencies provide 
innovative opportunities to invest in new projects without the barriers to entry that conventional 
funding methods present. Launching ICOs offers an appealing alternative to fundraising 
schemes for nuanced blockchain startups that seek to avoid the limitations imposed by 
following a bootstrapped model or the unexpected dilution of equity hold when venture 
capitalists finance such projects. For blockchain start-up’s, ICOs are effective — they allow 
startups to raise funds without having equity stakeholders scrutinising spending, prioritising 
financial returns over the general good of the product or service itself. 
 
Currently, ICOs present a greater risk of investment fraud and lack of consumer protection 
than shown in traditional equity markets. Due to the lack of applicable statutory and regulatory 
compliance governing ICOs, crypto-tokens issued give their proprietor no legal guarantee of 
liability against their respective token issuers. Terms and functionality of the token are defined 
in smart contracts that could contain errors or execute contract specifications that may result 
in financial losses incurred by both parties. The proliferation of ICOs and their value has 
inadvertently witnessed the growth of investment fraud, Ponzi schemes and multi-level 
marketing scams that attract investors without any prior assessment of the feasibility of 
prospective businesses/projects, the DAO incident being an example. 
 
It must be noted that ICO valuation is currently influenced by speculative purposes rather than 
the fundamental analysis of project development forecasts and the intrinsic value of the token 
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offered (EY, 2017). That is, prospective token holders are more likely to be motivated by the 
potential increase in value during the ICO process. By investing in crypto-tokens upon the 
onset of an ICO, investors commit to the expectation of making a return either through trading 
tokens on the secondary market or anticipating the appreciation of value during the ICO 
process (Bhaskar, Nian and Chuen, 2015; Tuzikov, Nanda and White, 2017). On the other 
hand, the lack of fundamental valuation leads to volatility in post-ICO trading, and 
consequently, as price changes within the secondary market are not adjusted by a 
fundamental market value, there are inherent investment risks that the credibility of token 
distribution is speculative. 
 
However, many businesses have issued tokens in return for funds and failed to complete the 
projects advertised during the sale. In response, the deployment of the ERC20 Token 
framework on the Ethereum platform addresses the need to standardise the protocol for token 
issuance (Tuzikov, Nanda and White, 2017). This ensures that token issuers provide more 
comprehensive documentation of projects and mandatory disclosures of project outlines 
before a sale can occur. 
 
However, there are numerous cases were ICOs have been successful. Table 3.3 below 
indicates crypto-tokens launched through ICOs that have managed to outperform the plethora 
of ICO projects that occurred in 2017 based on funds raised. This exemplifies the lucrative 
potential of fund-raising schemes through launching ICOs projects. 
Table 3.3: Top 5 ICO’s of 2017 
Most lucrative ICOs 2017 (Top 5 ICOs) 
Project Title Total Raised 
1) Hdac | $DAC US-Dollar  ($258 m) 
2) Filecoin | $FIL US-Dollar  ($157.7 m) 
3) Tezos | $XTZ US-Dollar  ($142.4 m) 
4) Sirin Labs | $SRN US-Dollar  ($105 m) 
5) Bancor | $BNT US-Dollar  ($95.3 m) 
 
Source: (Gibson, 2018)  
*All amounts raised where denominated in USD for representation purposes 
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3.3 Implications of Blockchain Technology on the Financial Industry 
Paech (2017:3) describes blockchain technology as an: 
“Internet-based database to store entitlements, of which identical copies of equal 
constitutive value are held by every network participant. The database enables each 
participant to trade these entitlements by instructing the database software 
accordingly, which will then autonomously and irreversibly effect the relevant changes 
to the network participants’ holdings” 
In other words, it represents a technological solution that embraces a unique combination of 
innovative features and concepts developed for traditional organisations to move beyond 
existing business models and leverage the capabilities of a distributed collaborative 
organisation. In a similar manner, Figure 3.1 elaborates on this definition in terms of key 
concepts that enable blockchain technology to organise people, projects, payment, 
information, and communication in smarter and more efficient ways, and develop better and 
safer documentation and control systems. 
Table 3.4: Basic Principles of Blockchain Technology 
Distributed database Each party on a blockchain has access to the entire database and its compete 
history. No single party controls the data or the information. Every party can 
verify the records of its transaction partners directly, without an intermediary  
Peer-to-Peer 
transmission 
Communication occurs directly between peers instead of through a central node. 
Ecah node stores and forwards information to all other nodes. 
Transparency with 
pseudonymity 
Every transaction and its associated value are visisble to anyone with access to 
the system. Each node or user, has a blockchain has a unique 30-plus character 
alphanumeric address that identifies it. Users can choose to remain anonymous 
or provide proof of their identity to others.Transactions occur between addresses 
Irreversibility of 
records 
Once a transaction is entered in the database and the accounts are updated, the 
records cannot be altered, because they’re linked to every transaction record that 
came before them (hence the term “chain”). Various computational algorithms 
and approaches are deployed to ensure that the recording on the database is 
permanent, chronologically ordered, and avaialable to all others on the network  
Computational Logic  The digital nature of the ledger means that blockchain transactions can be tied to 
computational logic and in essence programmed . So users can set up 
algorithms and rules that automatically trigger transactions between nodes. 
 
Source: (Iansiti and Lakhani, 2017) 
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Instituting these concepts and innovative elements within the financial industry has the 
potential to change fundamental concepts and infrastructural elements of the financial 
services ecosystem that could benefit from decentralising governance structures and 
eliminating the need for financial intermediation. The application of such technological 
solutions in capital markets, digital payment systems, transfers and remittances, trade finance 
and loan syndication would open financial industries to the capacities for operational 
simplification, transparency, regulatory efficiency improvement and counterparty risk 
reduction, as well as, disintermediate the process of performing end-to-end payments and 
reduce fraud in asset provenance and capital raising activities (International Finance 
Corporation, 2017). The underlying blockchain technology is likely to deliver a broad range of 
benefits in financial markets by introducing process efficiencies: transparency of the 
mechanisms governing settlement and clearing; near-instantaneous settlement; streamlined 
auditing due to guaranteed consistency and higher reliability following from removal of single 
points of failure (Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein and Ross, 2017). Likewise, other benefits 
may include: 
3.3.1 Reducing transaction costs and improving efficiency 
Blockchain applications have the potential to improve efficiency in organisational processes. 
More specifically, by speeding up the internal processes of information manipulation, 
identification, exchange, and validation—providing cost effectiveness and time efficiency in 
industry operations. Additionally, the innovation of its protocol in alternative payment systems 
enables faster, lower-cost and transparent exchanges of value; by reducing infrastructural 
costs involved in providing those services (World Economic Forum, 2015). Fundamentally, 
optimising costs by leveraging this technology is a result of its potential for value-creation by 
expanding its scope for cost saving; creating new value propositions by facilitating transactions 
via cost base reduction. 
 
3.3.2 Identity Management 
Utilising blockchains as public registers would provide accurate identification of users in the 
ecosystem, providing a transparent platform to create encrypted digital identities that reduce 
risk of fraud. Securing digital credentials via distributed ledgers could reduce validation and 
authentication procedures that amplify operational costs involved in managing and securing 
identities on digital platforms. To that end, improving identity management for storing and 
transferring identity attributes could yield significant implications for reducing counterparty risk 
in financial transactions. 
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3.3.3 Major impact to the real economy 
Introducing blockchain based infrastructure to the real economy could enable efficiencies, 
reduce cost base and open new revenue opportunities; especially in the fields of trade finance 
and provenance tracking. Firstly, it simplifies provenance tracking: as an immutable, secure, 
rich and transparent shared network the blockchain provides each participant with end-to-end 
visibility of the movement of goods and assets along the supply chain, offering capabilities for 
monitoring the delivery of goods in real-time. Secondly, it enables market participants to 
facilitate trade finance directly between parties and increases efficiency through automating 
issuance, reducing administrative costs and improving shipment tracking support (Gausdal, 
Czachorowski and Solesvik, 2018).  
 
3.3.4 Personalised financial services 
A key justification for utilising blockchain technology for financial services is its capacity to 
provide more granular, tailor-made services that cater to individual demands of participants in 
a marketplace of an otherwise standardised product offering. In the digital marketplace, 
participants may likely want to initiate financial proceedings that meet the requirements of their 
needs, which may be beyond the scope of service offerings available. Therefore, FSPs could 
utilise blockchain financial networks that could accommodate personalised services and open 
more business opportunities than financially viable in the brick and mortar approach (Swan, 
2017). 
 
3.3.5 Peer to Peer payment channels 
DLT enable financial platforms to create innovate financial instruments that allow transacting 
parties to send numerous payments amongst each other. Payment channels function as 
financial contracts (codified as smart contract on the blockchain network) that perform multiple 
transactions which are executed over time (Swan, 2017). This micropayment mechanism 
creates a digitised payment system that settles on net payments instead of gross transfers; 
enabling an alternative approach to providing banking services offered on a peer-to-peer basis 
as with Ripple.  Payment transactions constitute a major business area of global transaction 
banking and involve the administration of liquidity in any currency for companies, individuals 
and financial institutions. 
 
3.3.6 Improving Clearing, Settlement, and Record-Keeping Processes 
The clearing and settlement of transactions requires the intervention of a variety of 
intermediaries and third parties which contribute to the complexity and additional costs of 
maintaining an operational platform for payment systems (International Finance Corporation, 
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2017). Blockchain disintermediates third parties that support verification, validation and 
accelerates settlement by enabling the near real-time point-to-point transfer of funds between 
financial institutions (FIs), removing friction and accelerating settlement of recorded 
transactions. Disintermediating clearing, settlement and servicing processes can reduce costs 
and enable capital & liquidity management efficiencies. 
 
3.3.7 Automated Contract Execution 
Agreements detailed in smart contracts allow mutually distrustful parties to reduce risk factors 
involved in the digital form of creating contractual agreements and transferring value. By using 
a self-executing contract, parties commit themselves to abide by the rules and determinations 
of the underlying code, which guarantees and accelerates business outcomes since mutually 
agreed conditions are specified and documented in a secure and tamper-proof ledger; limiting 
unilateral counterparty actions (Egelund-Müller et al., 2017).The transparent, autonomous and 
secure nature of smart contracts reduces the risk of manipulation, bias or error. Also, 
automated contracts eliminate the need for the manual and error-prone processes required to 
execute contracts, minimising the possibilities of fraud or tampering when financial contracts 
are being formed or executed. 
 
3.3.8 Digital record keeping 
DLT creates records that are standardised, immutable, and easy for interested parties to 
query. By extension, blockchain allows real-time review and approval of financial data, 
ensuring that the integrity and transparency of information on the blockchain is upheld. As a 
decentralised ledger, blockchain eliminates the need to reconcile multiple ledgers since 
identical copies of the continuously updated ledger are held by every network participant at 
any time.  Furthermore, utilising this technology for identification, verification and validation 
purposes may allow an optimal identification of goods and the traceability of their associated 
transactions. To that end, DLT acts as a selectively accessible repository of documentation 
and evidence. 
 
3.3.9 Ownership Proof 
This provides visibility into assets and associated liens/ownerships based on transactional 
history that produces a transparent view of ownership titles and records the changes in asset 
ownership that occur on its database. Participants in a transaction have access to the same 
records, allowing them to validate transactions and verify identities or ownership without the 
need for third-party intermediaries. In the financial domain, blockchain offers participants a 
decentralised approach to a transaction platform for recording, tracking, monitoring, and 
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transferring rights to different asset classes within financial markets. This could reduce 
inefficiencies in the valuation of collateral for leasing and asset financing via cost reductions 
in acquiring information. 
 
3.3.10 Reengineering the process of underwriting and assessing risk for leveraged loan trading 
In the case of loan syndication, managing loan life cycles via smart contracts could create 
efficiencies in processes of KYC verification, due diligence review, underwriting automation, 
loan funding and payment dissemination. Blockchain offers a platform to store client history 
and contextual data that may be instrumental in quantifying risk and improve the accuracy of 
risk underwriting models. Moreover, the disbursement of principal and interest payments 
throughout the loan life cycle is automated, reducing operational risk. 
 
3.3.11 Protecting Intellectual Property and creating a decentralised Proof-of-Existence 
mechanism 
DLT offers an alternative model to protecting intellectual property by leveraging a proof-of 
existence mechanism that certifies the possession of copyrights, information, patents, 
contracts, rights or legal proceedings attached to existing financial documents. Using 
blockchain as an IP registry may help give clarity to copyright authors, owners and users, 
enabling them to document intellectual property on a secure, transparent and tamper-proof 
platform. This reduces the initial cost involved in commercialising of the underlying data set 
by reducing the administrative costs of managing and protecting intellectual property. 
 
3.3.12 Financial innovation 
The potential of this technology to achieve real-time transaction settlement can yield 
opportunities to create new forms of financial instruments and transform over the counter 
market infrastructures in capital markets; increased efficiency in securities issuance, transfer 
servicing, clearing and settlement, enforcing derivative contracts, asset registries, trading and 
information access. Mandatory events and payment distributions are managed via smart 
contracts embedded within the securities, reducing the scope for data errors, disputes and 
reconciliation lags, speeding up the end-to-end processes. Furthermore, business rules and 
smart contracts that execute based on one or more conditions can be built into the platform, 
helping blockchain financial networks to evolve as they mature and support end-to-end 
business processes that provide a wide range of activities. 
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3.3.13 Sharing Economy 
By enabling network participants to securely transact value without intermediaries, blockchain 
technology expands the possibilities in accessing a broader spectrum of resources available 
in the sharing economy. Digital platforms such as Airbnb, Uber and LiquidSpace are often 
limited by an infrastructural central point of failure: the operational resilience and security of 
preforming work processes and business functions is dependent on the reliability of a central 
intermediary (Killeen, 2015). Blockchain architecture offers an innovative approach to 
establishing infrastructure for a decentralised sharing economy. In that context, decentralising 
sharing economy platforms creates a new system of value transfer that better supports the 
dynamics of the global digital marketplace through peer-to-peer exchanges (Pazaitis, et al., 
2017). 
 
3.3.14 Audit Trail 
The element of immutability in distributed ledgers enables industry participants to access a 
non-reputable record of transactional history, which in turn enables the production of an 
immutable audit trail. This provides an irrevocable audit trail for all kinds of financial and non-
financial assets and transactions that are recorded on the blockchain; improving valuation 
accuracy of real assets in leasing and asset financing. Therefore, blockchain provides 
reasonable assurance that the integrity of financial data is accessible and available for 
automated and decentralised execution of compliance obligations on open and interconnected 
platforms. To that end, this technology facilitates process automation, enabling real-time audit 
reporting and surveillance applications for enforcing regulatory and compliance related 
activities (Scott, Loonam and Kumar, 2017). 
 
3.3.15 Regulation compliance 
Goldman Sachs (2016) approximates that globally banks incur a total of $18bn worth of AML 
compliance costs and using a shared database of validated customer information could reduce 
compliance cost and duplicative efforts involved in KYC onboarding by $5bn. Blockchain could 
facilitate a pre-authenticated approach to complying with AML/KYC legislation before 
transacting that could reshape the AML compliance implementation process. Likewise, 
Blockchain could significantly reduce the cost and complexity of regulatory reporting required 
for technological solutions by maintaining and documenting compliance via the use of a DLT 
platform (Larios-Hernández, 2017). With this technology, regulators are provided with a real-
time visibility of transactions and can monitor effectively the activities of transacting parties. 
Therefore, streamlining AML monitoring procedures by mutualising financial transaction 
information via a decentralised ledger could potentially reduce AML/KYC regulatory fines. 
 46 
 
Therefore, providing regulation with real-time transparent access to financial data ensures that 
regulators can maintain the legality, security and stability of financial markets. 
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3.4 Industry-specific applications of blockchain technology 
3.4.1 Payments, Clearing and Settlement 
Due to the market structure-related and technical issues that undermine existing payment 
systems, clearing and payment processes are often prone to price asymmetries, high servicing 
fees and financial risks. As a result, DLT represents an opportunity to deal with existing 
frictions in payments, clearing and settlement processes by creating efficiencies in end-to-end 
processing speed and expanding the availability of assets and funds on financial platforms. 
The technology implications of leveraging DLT for efficiency and security present a change in 
the role of existing processes and infrastructure in facilitating transactions involving cross 
border payments, forex exchange and securities trade. 
 
In the case of cross-border payments, blockchain technology reduces the operational 
complexity of conducting processes across different aspects within its value chain; innovating 
processes within pre-transaction, clearing, settlement and post-trade by removing the layers 
of intermediation. Consequently, implementing a DLT architecture to a payment network may 
improve information flows, reduce operational costs and promote real-time audit transparency 
within clearing and settlement processes. As discussed earlier, DLT implementations such as 
the InterLedger Protocol (ILP) used by Ripple streamline the process for transferring digital 
assets by enabling entities in different countries with different payment systems to more easily 
transact with one another. Furthermore, providing efficiencies by reducing duplication of 
processes, settlement time, collateral requirements and operational overheads that existing 
payment systems such as SWIFT require to facilitate cross-border payments. 
 
In the existing payments system, interbank payments are netted before being settled, which 
often delays settlement finality and imposes liquidity constraints on payment processes. By 
enabling a shift to near real-time settlement finality, this technology lowers the liquidity 
requirements of existing payment systems, which eliminates the need to prefund a payment 
account or post collateral in order to complete a transaction. This provides a deterministic 
approach to clearing and settlement processes and reduces the liquidity constraints and 
financial risks that FSPs face when they guarantee settlement finality on behalf of its 
customers or participants (Paech, 2017). 
 
Likewise, key components to this technology in facilitating peer-to-peer networking, distributed 
data storage, and cryptography provide solutions to the financial inefficiencies of payment, 
clearing and settlement processes through: 
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3.4.1.1 Reduced Operational Risks for clearing procedures 
This provides efficiencies in the operational capacity of FSPs to evaluate if parties to a 
transaction fulfill financial requirements to conduct business. This includes the entity’s 
creditworthiness or ability to access liquidity resources, as well as legal requirements such as 
the entity’s ability to meet any contractual obligations to the arrangement or to have proper 
business licenses to conduct business (David, Wang, Malone, Ravi, Marquardt, Chen, Badev, 
Brezinski and et.al, 2016). 
 
3.4.1.2 Improved network resiliency through distributed data management 
By leveraging cryptography to encrypt transactional information, parties can transfer value 
with a high degree of privacy and security. As a distributed network of participants in a financial 
environment, information regarding records of ownership and transaction histories can be 
maintained across multiple nodes; providing a transparent and immutable approach to 
facilitating processes that handle payment, clearing and settlement (David, Wang, Malone, 
Ravi, Marquardt, Chen, Badev, Brezinski and et.al, 2016).  
 
3.1.1.1 Reduced operational and financial risk 
By decentralising and automating the processes underlying payment, clearing and settlement 
systems, the characteristic of system resiliency and security demonstrated by blockchain 
technology is critical to managing inherent risk of handling these functions. By enabling real-
time clearing and settlement, this technology reduces the duration of exposure—minimising 
the capital requirements needed to cater to operational, counterparty and liquidity risks 
inherent within market operations (David et al., 2016). 
  
3.4.2 Trade Finance 
The implementation of a blockchain-based infrastructure opens possibilities to drive 
efficiencies, reduce cost base and open new revenue opportunities in trade finance. As 
financial services aim at balancing differences between trading partners and minimising risks 
in the trade finance industry, there is need to restructure business models that build trust and 
improve credit and funding facilities that guarantee exchange of commodities globally. 
Cognizant (2017) identifies key areas for applying blockchain technology in the trade finance 
industry as: 
3.4.2.1 Providing payment certainty to sellers by automating payment methods. 
Due to the discrepancies that may arise from trade flow and settlement processes, there is 
significant business risk that arises from misaligning the terms of agreement defining payment 
methods with the underlying trade contracts that define terms of trade. By enabling near real-
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time automated payments and settlement processes, blockchain reduces the high costs, 
contractual delays and process complexities that are involved in commodities exchange. The 
securitisation of payment instruments (using letters of credit, for example) and related trade 
documents (such as sale contracts) on distributed ledgers reduces the risk of settlement 
delays and legal disputes regarding terms of arrangement, allowing parties a degree of 
settlement certainty that enables faster payment methods (Cognizant, 2017). 
 
3.4.2.2 Providing delivery assurance to buyers through trade asset tokenisation 
The digital tokenisation of trade assets in a blockchain provides stakeholders a real-time and 
transparent view of financial information associated within trade assets within the supply chain. 
This enables stakeholders to track an asset from its creation, through potentially multiple 
stages of transportation, and eventually through purchase and even managing asset 
inventory. By implementing various proofs of concept (PoC) within trade finance platforms and 
securing trade agreements in a distributed ledger, participants can guarantee the authenticity, 
legal enforceability and origin of goods and trade documents such as bills of lading, letters of 
credit and invoices. Consequently, a clear chain of provenance is established; improving the 
traceability of ownership in trade assets along the supply chain and providing visibility into the 
delivery process of trade assets through real-time asset tracking. Henceforth, DLT improves 
the ability of stakeholders to foresee and manage the business risks of en-route delays, 
document fraud and shipment damage that could occur. 
 
3.4.2.3 Mitigating risks and increasing financing revenues for banks through payment instrument 
digitisation. 
The potential for issuing and transacting in verifiable records using blockchain could improve 
the access to financing for supply chains and trade credit essential to reducing working capital 
deficits that hold up production globally (Cognizant, 2017). The application of smart contracts 
in automating the process of lending and repayments, coordination of production schedules 
and formalising digital trade documents could eliminate the high costs of intermediation and 
open opportunities for credit and funding that guarantees exchange of goods. In this context, 
payment instruments such as bills of exchange and letters of credit represented as smart 
contracts between issuing and redeeming parties to exercise within a network with real-time 
audit transparency, which is less prone to risk of fraud and duplicate financing. As a result, 
blockchain technology encourages the flow of information among participants in the supply 
chain, improving the trust between parties and allowing financial institutions to grant working 
capital loans to finance trade. 
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Due to the institutional bottlenecks and market-related inefficiencies of the trade finance 
industry, the lack of adequate trade credit servicing of SMEs brings attention to the 
operationally inefficient, costly and time-consuming outcome of brick and mortar approaches 
(Casey, Crane, Gensler, Johnson and Narula, 2018; Cognizant, 2017). A recent survey found 
a trade finance gap of $1.5 trillion with 57% of trade finance requests by SMEs rejected, 
compared to only 10% by multinational companies 
 
Therefore, the direct issuance of payment instruments through blockchain could prevent 
fraudulent invoicing practices, improve SME financing options through increased liquidity of 
receivables, and enable process efficiencies in managing receivables (Cognizant, 2017). For 
example, startups like Sweetbridge are piloting DLT platforms aiming to lower the cost of trade 
finance and helping to reduce the time taken to issue letters of credit (Rand Europe, 2017). It 
allows firms to collateralise their own assets and committed revenues as security for temporary 
trade financing. 
 
3.4.3 Capital Markets: Digital issuance, trading and settlements of securities 
Capital markets could benefit from distributed ledgers as a transparent and rapidly updated 
shared record of one single aspect of business activities (Mainelli and Milne, 2016:18). It 
introduces a peer-to-peer network of securities that openly and transparently facilitates the 
exchange for capital; disintermediating the function of issuing, trading and settling securities 
in capital markets. 
 
The use-case of DLT has the potential to improve the operational efficiency of asset transfer, 
creating the ability to streamline clearing, settlement and servicing activities via automation of 
smart contracting, essentially reducing the time and resources required to perform these 
processes (World Economic Forum, 2016). The open architecture of distributed ledgers 
supports direct access of participants to information regarding the ownership and transfer of 
ownership of securities, therefore, allowing participants to: establish trust before final 
settlement; evaluate the legal validity of exchange; and discover discrepancies in the clearing 
and settlement process when exceptions arise (Mainelli and Milne, 2016). Consequently, 
through post-trade automation and efficiency enhancements, settlement delays could 
potentially be reduced to near real-time settlement. 
 
This creates an opportunity for market infrastructures within the ecosystem to integrate data 
from various financial systems and streamline a wide range of business processes such as 
real-time audits for financial reporting; netting and clearing; risk and collateral management; 
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and regulatory compliance activities (Collomb and Sok, 2016; Mainelli and Milne, 2016). These 
operational processes characterise the financial requirements of facilitating securities trade 
and by streamlining these processes within a DLT architecture, the potential to reduce middle 
and back-end office costs and risks in capital markets can be realised (Mainelli and Milne, 
2016:22). 
 
Table 3.4 outlines the potential benefits of implementing blockchain for capital markets across 
its value chain. It summarises some of the leading interests of applying blockchain technology 
within capital markets. 
 
Table 3.5: Potential Benefits of Blockchain technology for Capital Markets 
Pre-Trade Trade Post-Trade Custody & securities servicing 
Transparency 
and 
verification of 
holdings 
reduced 
credit 
exposures 
 
Mutualisation 
of static data 
Secure, real-time 
transaction 
matching, and 
immediate 
irrevocable 
settlement 
 
Automatic 
reporting and 
more transparent 
supervision for 
market 
authorities 
 
Higher AML 
standards 
No central clearing 
for real-time cash 
transactions 
 
Reduced 
margin/collateral 
requirements 
 
Faster novation and 
efficient post-trade 
processing 
 
Fungible use of 
assets as collateral 
 
Auto-execution of 
smart contracts 
Primary issuance directly onto 
a blockchain 
 
Automation and de-duplication 
of servicing processes 
 
Richer central datasets with flat 
accounting hierarchies 
 
Common reference data 
 
Fund 
subscriptions/redemptions 
processed automatically on the 
blockchain 
 
Simplification of fund servicing, 
accounting, allocations and 
administration 
 
Source: (Oliver Wyman, 2016) 
Apart from the impact of cryptocurrencies and token issuance that bring innovative 
opportunities to financing capital markets, initiatives by Nasdaq LINQ and the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) represent increasing adoption of blockchain technology within securities 
issuance, trading and settlement. For example, Australian Stock Exchange recently 
experimented with blockchain technology to develop distributed ledger-based solutions for 
clearing and settling trades, while Nasdaq LINQ introduced an integrated payment system 
using a distributed ledger to accelerate clearing and settlement of private securities 
transactions for non-listed companies (Casey, et al., 2018). 
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3.5 Conclusion: Steering financial inclusion via Blockchain solutions 
Blockchain technology has the potential to initiate a generation of socio-economic outcomes 
that could restructure the financial environment: enabling access to financial products and 
services for previously marginalised individuals and businesses (especially within emerging 
markets) to participate within the global commerce ecosystem. Due to the high transactional 
and regulatory costs associated with providing/utilising financial services, many individuals 
and business are often excluded from participating in the financial industry. The World Bank 
group report indicates that 42% of the global adult population does not participate within the 
formal financial system; where individuals within developing areas of the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa have 86% and 66% of their population having no access to traditional bank 
accounts (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015; Zins and Weill, 2016). The high demand for financial 
inclusion addresses the need for democratising financial services; catering for equal, 
unrestricted and universal access to, and use of different types of distributed services provided 
at a responsible price, by legitimate institutions and in a cost-effective manner (Salampasis 
and Mention 2017). 
 
The unavailability of formal and regulated financial services for international remittances, 
collateralisation of illiquid assets and currency exchange facilities for all income levels 
underlines the operational inefficiencies, technological limitations and antiquated processes 
that characterise existing financial systems in expanding the access of financial services to 
the unbanked. Blockchain-based solutions provide the opportunity to shift the infrastructure of 
global financial services; instrumental to improving the economic outcomes of the financially 
excluded and alleviating the impact of poverty that follows them (Jaag and Bach 2017). 
 
A barrier to entry for individuals that seek financial inclusion is the difficulty of creating digital 
identities with verifiable credentials, a key attribute to accessing financial services in this 
modern era. Without verifiable identity credentials, individuals and businesses are involuntarily 
marginalised from participating in the financial industry, limiting their access to financial 
services that improve socio-economic outcomes (Salampasis and Mention 2017). Blockchain 
technology has the potential to improve identity management systems, offering innovative 
solutions to the management of identities in an ecosystem where financially marginalised 
groups can create/protect legal digital identities with minimal infrastructural requirements.  
With digital identities, individuals gain greater access to financial services since financial 
service providers often impose legal and regulatory prerequisites to utilising these services.  
Equally importantly, leveraging blockchain technology allows FSPs to simplify and speed up 
 53 
 
the processes required to fulfil regulatory obligations (namely AML/KYC) creating 
opportunities to offer other financial services that were previously unavailable. 
 
The potential for financial innovation with this technology replaces the centralised business 
model of the financial industry; allowing stakeholders in the financial ecosystem to explore 
ways of reducing transaction costs, increase transaction speed, eliminate multiple 
transactions and mitigate fraud. In the case of cryptocurrencies, this technology provides 
network and infrastructure to create currency exchange platforms and payment systems that 
could stimulate financial inclusion (Ohnesorge, 2018).  It develops a new financial system that 
uses innovative and technology-led business models that do not rely on banks and financial 
institutions, creating value propositions that reduce the costs of cross-border payments and 
operating remittance systems (Holotiuk, Pisani and Moormann, 2017). 
 
The application of blockchain technology in the field of currency exchange and international 
remittances allows participants to bypass the need for financial intermediaries to facilitate 
money transfers, offering alternative solutions to a traditional system of payment services that 
is characterised by high transaction costs and long settlement times. In the traditional system, 
the remittance process flow is primarily facilitated by small to mid-size money transfer 
operators that are hampered in their ability to scale owing to resource and latency constraints, 
illiquidity and a growing reluctance from banks to service smaller MTOs due to compliance 
overheads and moves to reduce the risk of their portfolios (Safahi, 2018). Since 
cryptocurrencies generally do not have formal access restrictions, utilising cryptocurrencies 
for money transfers across borders could reduce operating expenses and capital costs 
involved in prefunding transactions before they are verified. 
 
In another way, blockchain technology creates a new business to business protocol that is 
efficient and auditable and can be implemented as a distributed and secure network to 
facilitating monetary transfers. By reducing the transaction costs and increasing efficiencies 
in the global remittance industry, the ability of this innovation to ensure the security and 
integrity of transactions could stimulate financial inclusion, allowing previously marginalised 
groups access to a transparent open-access registry for the financial services industry to 
facilitate monetary transfers (Jaag and Baach 2017). Likewise, the capabilities of DLT to 
provide additional information and functionalities to transactions provides analytical tools and 
data essential to managing processes to optimise loan underwriting; appraising financial 
assets; and automating regulatory reporting for the unbanked with minimum infrastructure 
involved. 
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The potential for financial innovation in developing trust-less business models, widening 
financial opportunities in the financial services sector and delivering value through creating 
efficiencies in financial processes, makes blockchain technology a key enabler to financial 
inclusion. Processing payments through blockchain technology could address the underlying 
issues that challenge emerging markets; low banking penetration, strong demand for financial 
services, high levels of mobile penetration and a less-developed financial infrastructure. In 
conclusion, blockchain offers an alternative approach to providing real-time, transparent and 
tamper-proof transactions without the need to rely on banks and financial institutions. 
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4. Challenges of Blockchain Technology  
4.1 Introduction 
To begin with, a fundamental concern that limits the development of blockchain technology is 
the lack of understanding among businesses, end-users and intermediaries about how the 
technology operates, the potential use-cases of its implementations and the potential benefits 
it may confer (Rand Europe, 2017). Even though, the vision for adopting applications 
supported by blockchain systems has been embraced significantly, there is need for clarity 
regarding the terminology  and functionality of this technology within the range of approaches 
and differences in its technical implementation (Ferrarini, Maupin and Hinojales, 2017) In this 
section, the study discusses the challenges faced by DLT/blockchain in relation to 
development and adoption of the technology by markets and end-users, and in relation to 
performance, regulatory uncertainty, legal status and technological feasibility of blockchain 
across industry sectors. 
 
4.2 Performance  
4.2.1 Energy Intensive Consumption 
The underlying PoW system that supports most implementations of this technology is intended 
to be resource intensive in order to amplify the cost to security attacks. However, maintaining 
such systems requires high energy usage, which reduces the efficiency of computational 
power relative to energy consumption needed. As the difficulty in achieving consensus over 
the network increases, there are concerns over the operational and economic efficiency of 
PoW  (Malone and O’Dwyer, 2014; Vranken, 2017). It is believed to pose a growing 
environmental threat to energy sustainability, as the need for increased computing power 
could potentially result in high energy consumption and associated costs (Rand Europe, 
2017). To date, studies conducted on Bitcoin show that the network consumes 250MW to 
500MW per day, similarly pegged to the total energy consumption of Ireland (Mainelli and 
Milne, 2016). 
 
4.2.2 Scalability 
Blockchain protocols are designed to be self-automated mechanisms that add blocks to the 
network at approximate intervals. However, limiting the maximum block size without optimising 
the system for growth in transaction volumes effectively limits the transaction throughput. The 
consensus-based nature of blockchain mechanisms requires significant computational power 
that delays transaction speed when demand for data storage grows. For example, the growth 
of Bitcoin has shown that the requirements for storage, bandwidth, and computational power 
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required to maintain its network have increased exponentially (Kikitamara, 2017). As a result, 
the increase in the number of pending transactions on the network translates to longer 
response times. 
 
This study also explains that a major challenge to blockchain scalability is the tendency 
towards swhen a blockchain increases. However, proposals such as the Lighting Network, 
SegWit, sidechains and hard forks have given relief to the dilemma at hand; there is still need 
for fundamental protocol redesign of blockchains to scale significantly while retaining their 
decentralisation. More importantly, there is a concern that the current standard of blockchain 
technology can only achieve seven transactions/sec compared to mainstream payment 
processors (e.g. Visa) that can achieve a peak rate of 56000 transactions/sec (Croman, 
Decker, Eyal, Gencer, Juels, Kosba, Miller and et al, 2016). This highlights the limitations of 
decentralised blockchains in scaling up the network performance to compete against existing 
industry standards. 
 
4.3 Technological Challenges  
4.3.1 Usability 
In a financial context, designing applications supported by blockchain technology is a difficult 
endeavour that entails optimsing factors of robustness, scalability and algorithmic efficiency 
in systems while curtailing the risks that undermine digital financial systems. To that end, 
developing applications and use-cases that consider these factors often creates a degree of 
added complexity to such systems. The complexity of this technology comprises of several 
layers of abstraction that often minimise usability for its end users. This problem is a result of 
the maturity of technology: the early stage of development in blockchains describes an 
ecosystem of developers and service operators that lack adequate tooling to address these 
infrastructural challenges. 
 
A primary concern to the technical aspects of blockchain technology is identifitying a simplified 
approach of improving user experience by managing the inherent tradeoffs that affect 
platforms supported by distributed ledgers The lack of adequate tooling for developer and end-
user support has posed negative impacts on system security and the performance of many 
deployments of this technology (Mendling, Weber, Van der Aalst and Vom Brocke, 2018). To 
meet this challenge, various stakeholders in the blockchain ecosystem are investigating 
different implementations of consensus protocols, security models and innovative functions 
that may improve the technical capabilities of its application (López-Pintado et al., 2017; 
Mendling et al., 2018). 
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4.3.2 Operational risks of transition 
There is uncertainty over the resilience of blockchain applications available that can match the 
level of security, performance and fault-tolerance shown by existing forms of technology. 
Business processes built on blockchain are emblematic of the operational risks that come into 
play when disruptive technology runs parallel to prevailing industry standards (Niforos, 
Ramchandran and Rehermann, 2017). Currently, the state of developing blockchain 
applications has not matured sufficiently to warrant enablers to overhaul existing business 
processes and replace them with blockchain-based alternatives.  When blockchain solutions 
are vulnerable to technology and operational failure, enablers must consider contingencies 
that mitigate such risks and ensure business continuity (Deloitte, 2017). 
 
To many industry players, overhauling business elements and subsequently deploying 
blockchain solutions is cost prohibitive, therefore, they will need to adopt an experimental 
approach to developing this technology. This prototyping phase seeks to address performance 
issues involved in interfacing with large existing back-office processes, complex legacy IT 
systems, or processes created to comply with existing standards (Deshpande, Stewart, Lepetit 
and Gunashekar, 2017). As industries continue to adopt blockchain, incorporating the new 
technology within existing systems entails conducting blockchain pilots with workarounds that 
propel the innovation lifecycle and improve their value propositions. 
 
4.4 Regulatory Challenges 
4.4.1 Standardisation 
While industry participants agree that distributed ledgers will have to be interoperable and 
integrate with existing infrastructure, systems and rules, stakeholders are fighting to ensure 
that their applications become the industry standards. The emergence of multiple, non-
interoperable DLT/blockchain implementations has led to a fragmented ecosystem 
characterised by varying competencies in system development languages, smart contract 
functionality, consensus models and transaction schemes (de Meijer, 2016). As a result, 
implementations of blockchain often have trouble in communicating and exchanging both 
value and data with each other. Thus, there is an urgent call for fragmented DLT/blockchain 
systems competing, each with their proprietary, non-interoperable standards and protocols to 
resolve challenges in interoperability and limiting widespread adoption. 
 
Furthermore, Yeoh (2017) argues that a key factor to the proliferation of market failure and 
financial crime on DLTs is the absence of strategic governance to set up standards and 
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enforce compliance measures. Implementing blockchain solutions in the financial industry has 
the potential to disrupt business structures, effecting change in market behaviour. Currently, 
blockchain systems are governed on the basis of distributed consensus amongst their users, 
however, any oversight of the governance protocol (such as consensus mechanism) and its 
parallel to regulatory and legal frameworks that enforce rights—maintaining financial 
stability—could destabilise markets by transmitting systemic risks, creating market distortions 
and facilitating illegal activity (Paech, 2017). At the same time, the lack of common standards 
for regulating interactions within blockchain financial networks adds to the growing uncertainty 
there is for enforcing legal provisions for assets and contracts that are held on blockchains, 
largely concerning processes that govern the acquisition and disposition of assets and the 
execution of smart contracts. 
 
A process of standardisation ensures interoperability and compatibility across the blockchain 
system is upheld, as well as, maintaining the integrity of the technology as a secure, 
immutable. This open collaboration must form a unified approach to develop rules and 
procedures that deal with the technical standards of network membership, management of 
permissions, transaction validity, issuance of new assets and their tokenisation, dispute 
resolution, software updates, regulatory reporting, and protection against cyber risks.  Industry 
alignment is needed to address the current state of governance applied to blockchain 
technology towards developing an effective design and implementation of a regulatory and 
legal framework capable of governing different types of blockchains. 
 
The need for industry standardisation within the DLT ecosystem addresses the challenges of 
improving interoperability and data interchange among users, applications and systems that 
are within the blockchain ecosystem. A key aspect to maximising the potential of blockchain 
is the need to standardise the development of blockchain systems regardless of the function 
they are intended for. Ryan and Cain (2017) asserts that establishing blockchain standards 
could reduce the need for duplication and reconciliation between parties and reduce market 
friction; facilitating a new wave of innovation, productivity, employment and industry 
opportunities. More specifically, standardisation will create a gateway for multiple blockchains 
to be interoperable and compatible with existing financial standards. 
 
4.4.2 Compliance and governance 
Technological developments often move faster than laws and regulation adapt (Bauman, et 
al., 2016). In the case of blockchain, the lack of regulatory responsiveness from governments 
and authorities often signals how innovations with this technology are delayed by the 
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incompatibility of its offerings to current regulations. Likewise, the lack of awareness about 
blockchain technology has led to misunderstanding how blockchain-based applications 
correspond to the current regulatory framework given the variation of technological designs 
that exist. Despite the potential of DLT/blockchain to disrupt the financial sector, a key concern 
to integrating blockchain solutions has been the difficulty in regulating the scope and use of 
this technology. 
 
Initially, regulatory response became more apparent when the prevalence of legal and criminal 
issues arose from the proliferation and use of cryptocurrencies in the financial industry—the 
earliest application of blockchain technology. In response, Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN) established a regulatory precedent for virtual currency operators that were 
classified as money-service businesses (MSB) which detailed certain registration, reporting 
and record-keeping obligations (Böhme, et al., 2015). FINCEN brought action against Ripple 
Labs LLC when it violated several requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) by exchanging 
cryptocurrencies without registering as an MSB and failing to comply with their AML/KYC 
obligations (FinCEN, 2015). By fining Ripple Labs LLC and bringing them to compliance, 
FINCEN sought to safeguard the financial system from the illicit use of virtual currencies; 
providing a legislative mandate that is intended to promote and enforce standards that govern 
its use. In the same light, other use-cases of this underlying technology can be said to lack 
such adequate regulatory oversight which is essential to: mitigating systemic risks and 
addressing financial vulnerabilities that arise from using DLT in the financial environment; 
establishing a regulatory framework that makes market participants liable to the AML/KYC 
measures and prevents money-laundering, terrorism financing, and tax evasion (Yeoh, 2017). 
 
To that end, regulators are still trying to figure out a combination of regulatory approaches that 
could include this technology within an existing regulatory framework.  A demand of regulatory 
recognition for blockchain technology raises a unique challenge for regulatory compliance, 
enforcement authorities and legal standards: the need to adapt and develop regulations that 
consider the characteristic ability of providing financial services within a decentralised, 
immutable and anonymous environment. Yeoh (2017) points out that the existing modern 
financial system is governed by a combination of technical and legal code, with an inclination 
to rely on legal codes to govern the activities that occur in the financial sector. 
 
By nature, blockchain technology embraces the aspect of technical codes by using a 
governance mechanism that automates the function of regulating financial services, for which 
its protocols and software draw less emphasis on maintaining legal codes to regulating such 
systems. In the absence of any legal measures to regulating its application, blockchain-based 
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systems are exposed to risk of market failures and systemic issues that central authorities 
often mitigate through regulatory intervention.In the event of an unforeseen complication, 
technical codes do not guarantee any legal obligation to resolve the breach in compliance; a 
key function of financial intermediaries to ensure that multi-stakeholder processes are liable 
to applicable law. Such challenges indicate why distributed ledger systems need to incorporate 
legal codes, as enforcing regulatory compliance requires a clear legal and technical authority 
with regard to developing governance standards. 
 
Despite the regulatory complexities of governing this technology within the current framework, 
stakeholders in the financial industry are primarily concerned with how excessive regulatory 
measures could stifle innovation and subsequently limit its potential to develop business use-
cases in the industry. As blockchain technology evolves through the early stages of its 
innovation cycle, regulatory bodies are trying to determine appropriate ways to balance the 
need for regulatory response while developing blockchain-based solutions.  To date, 
regulators have followed a “wait and see” policy to regulatory intervention with the intention of 
exploring the innovative capabilities of the technology in use (Herian, 2018; Maupin; 2017). 
However, such a stance has become less viable with time as uses of this technology cannot 
continue operating beyond the current framework that supervises and regulates applications 
for financial services. Therefore, more attention must be applied to resolving regulatory 
challenges that apply to blockchain-based use-cases rather than the underlying technology 
that still needs freedom to innovate further. 
 
Above all, the direction of regulatory oversight in this field needs to consider the financial 
stability implications of DLTs and continuously identify key points that market participants and 
policymakers face in solving licensing, compliance and enforcement issues. Even though 
distributed ledgers, blockchains, smart contracts and other related technologies signify a point 
of departure from traditional concepts of jurisdiction, liability and enforceability, regulators seek 
to collaborate with other key players in this industry in offering clarity and uniformity to the 
otherwise uncertain regulatory dilemma of using such technology within existing frameworks. 
This entails adapting and developing regulatory approaches that prioritise legal certainty, 
governance standards and regulatory guidelines protecting consumers from inordinate and 
poorly understood financial risks (Maupin, 2017). By extension, implementing compliance 
standards amongst competing service providers opens the possibility of an interoperable 
ecosystem of blockchains that share similarities to their design fundamentals. 
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4.5 Legal issues 
4.5.1 Jurisdiction 
Blockchain as a DLT has no geographical limit as nodes can be located anywhere in this 
world.  As a result, the decentralised nature of block chain with nodes distributed across the 
world diminishes the degree of legal certainty that governing law can be applied to nodes 
located across multiple jurisdictions. At a global level, the heterogeneity of regulatory 
frameworks and compliance needs across borders present a key obstacle to the applicability 
of blockchain systems. As contractual relationships and governing law differ across 
jurisdictions, nodes participating across a blockchain platform are at the risk of contravening 
the rights and obligations of contractual law inadvertently. Therefore, without establishing a 
framework on governing contractual agreements universally, the validity and enforceability of 
financial undertakings performed on blockchains pose complex jurisdictional issues especially 
when determining what course of action can be applied to errors and violations that occur on 
the network (Reynolds and Irwin, 2017). 
 
4.5.2 Legal Liability 
In the case where financial services are provided via DLT, the legal status of blockchain 
services is highly unclear, as not much clarity is provided on the attribution and allocation of 
the risks and liability that stakeholders may have. By nature, block chain is intended to render 
established legal concepts and financial regulation obsolete, therefore, a systemic issue of 
there being no authority that controls or stops the functioning of public blockchains 
subsequently creates a myriad of liability issues. Additionally, Motsi-Omoijiade (2018) explains 
that in a decentralised trust-less environment, transacting parties utilising DLT as financial 
platforms may not receive enough consumer protection and may find difficulty in solving 
dispute resolution issues. Since the deployment of blockchain applications occurred before 
any significant undertaking was done in defining jurisdiction and applicable legislation, there 
is uncertainty over determining applicable contractual law for transactions that occur on the 
platform and assigning liability accordingly. 
 
4.5.3 Legal enforceability of Smart Contracts  
These issues are prominent in the application of smart contracts in the financial services 
sector, where the current legal framework has remained ineffectual in terms of the implications 
of this technology. Smart contracts mirror traditional financial contracts that automate and 
guarantee the performance of contractual obligations without the need for a counterparty, 
intermediary, legal system or regulatory authorities. In the first place, stakeholders in the DLT 
ecosystem have expressed concerns about the difficulty of qualifying smart contracts as 
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legally binding. In most cases, smart contracts are created independent of the legal 
procedures required to formalise their terms of agreement as legally contractual obligations. 
As a result, these issues raise uncertainty about the legal enforceability of smart contracts; 
whether the provisions of a smart contract can be performed without any legal complications. 
 
By the same token, the challenge of defining jurisdiction and the applicable legislation prior to 
provision of blockchain services has left the financial sector in doubt over the legality of smart 
contracts; a factor that contributes to the limited number of applications where smart contracts 
have been implemented. Although smart contracts seek to reduce transaction costs and 
create efficiencies, there has been a limited number of use-cases where smart contracts have 
shown to be legally compliant to the highly regulated regime of the financial services sector, 
hence, limiting the scope and number of financial opportunities where smart contracts are 
applicable. For this reason, current implementations of smart contracts need to develop further 
towards codifying digital contracts that accommodate financial contexts of varying risk, liability 
and enforceability. 
 
Since smart contracts are autonomous, irreversible and deterministic, an inherent weakness 
to deploying them is their inability to account for the implied expectations or unforeseen 
circumstances that may develop during the term of contract. (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2016). 
This includes: 
1) coding errors that cause unexpected performance issues 
2) requests to terminate a contract 
3) subsequent changes in law or regulation that affect the contract  
It follows that, such conditions are likely to invalidate a contract, however, the immutability of 
DL makes smart contracts a problem when contracting parties are entitled to terminate or 
unwind a transaction subject legal authority when it no longer reflects a legal position. This 
draws attention to how ill-equipped smart contracts are for handling legal undertakings that 
include: arbitrating for dispute resolution issues; assigning legal liability to contracting parties 
that have performed a smart contract pseudonymously; and protecting proprietary information 
contained in smart contracts on a distributed ledger. 
 
As the use and implementation of blockchain becomes more widespread, legal 
representatives, consumers and industry players in its ecosystem need to collaborate and 
design blockchain systems that consider the implication of this technology within different legal 
contexts. From a financial perspective, the legal implications of operating within the existing 
legal and regulatory framework require that blockchain solutions provide legal certainty that 
the law will be used to enforce the rights and obligations of parties concerned; considering 
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their liability in consumer protection law as well as their need to comply with AML/KYC 
standards and determining their tax obligations. However, the challenging issue of drawing 
blockchain closer to existing legal frameworks is how antithetical the pursuit of legal certainty 
is to a technology that was initially conceptualised to eliminate the need for a legal 
intermediary. 
 
4.6 Security Issues 
Apart from the BFT issues that threaten the functionality of a financial blockchain network, a 
few challenges to current implementations of DLT have exposed existing security 
vulnerabilities to the protocols, organisational formats and network capabilities that define 
blockchain.  By extension, such fundamental problems to blockchain technology significantly 
undermine the functionality of its application layer as a secure platform. 
 
4.6.1 Key Management 
Most blockchain implementations are dependent upon cryptographically generated public and 
private keys that allocate the authority to transfer or retain value; this entails securing 
contracts, physical and digital property, tokens and other financial assets that can be kept on 
distributed ledgers. Cybercriminals have become more complex, comprehensive and 
innovative in developing techniques to breach security points and steal financial data, personal 
identifiable information and intellectual property; inadvertently challenging the underlying 
characteristics of operational resilience, data encryption, auditability, transparency and the 
immutability of financial platforms run on blockchains. In the case of cryptocurrencies, the 
ever-growing threat to cybersecurity compromises the initial premise of cryptography in 
securing the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data kept on those blockchains. The 
primary security vectors include DDoS attacks, phishing, malware and exploiting 
implementation vulnerabilities. 
 
By unlawfully gaining identity credentials from stakeholders on a financial network, hackers 
are capable of data-tampering, disrupting the overall operations of business platforms and 
facilitating fraudulent transactions. Hackers that exploit security vulnerabilities by stealing 
private keys consequently take control of assets or information privy to those keys. A financial 
setting where security incidents enable illicit ICO schemes, fraudulent exchanges and scam 
wallet services to prevail indicates a misconception of what DLT architecture can offer towards 
preventing data malleability, authentication and cryptography issues: mitigating the risk of 
facilitating financial processes through a distributed ledger platform. 
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Despite the emergence of exchanges, digital wallet services, mixers and payment processors 
to address these financial risks, these intermediaries have also endured the threat of 
cybercriminals. Coupled with the irrevocability of financial processes carried out on 
blockchains and limitations of cryptography in securing distributed ledgers, intermediaries are 
often exposed to the operational risk of handling security threats on platforms where financial 
loss could amplify the risk of systemic failure when intervention within market infrastructure 
could prevent financial destabilisation and reduce losses (Motsi-Omoijiade, 2018). 
 
Likewise, cryptocurrency exchanges have experienced a significant surge in cybercriminal 
attacks exploiting codebase errors and technical loopholes in the system architecture, which 
have significantly influenced the high volatility trends and asset bubbles that occur within 
cryptocurrency markets due to the perceived security risk factors involved in utilising exchange 
services (Böhme et al., 2016; Li and Wang, 2017). An informal approach to following up 
AML/KYC compliance on transacting parties allows anonymity among parties utilising such 
services and creates a channel for money-laundering, terrorist financing and tax avoidance 
(Motsi-Omoijiade, 2018). Additionally, the nature of DLT applications that automate exchange 
networks without intermediary assistance heightens the complexity of creating and managing 
cryptographic keys, since currency holders are not legally protected from any liability of theft 
or loss that occurs in a permission less network. 
 
4.6.2 Privacy Management 
Regardless of how blockchain technology enables a trust less and censorship-resistant 
system that provides transparency and immutability, there is conflict of interest for many 
individuals, organisations and industries that believe it violates their right to data privacy and 
individual sovereignty (Kasireddy, 2017). Financial applications of DLT platforms thrive on 
pseudo-anonymity, however, regulatory obligations for financial systems require identification 
of contracting/transacting parties on these platforms: which limits the degree of anonymity that 
can be achieved on DLs. Additionally, the immutability of data kept on a blockchain invalidates 
GDPR provisions that allow individuals the right to have their private data erased when there 
is no compelling reason for its continued use. As a result, this unintentional lapse in governing 
the control and access of data poses risks to the rights and liberties of user identity as well as 
the confidentiality of information kept on such platforms. 
 
For companies and organisations in the financial sector that prioritise information being kept 
confidential, the transparency of certain blockchain systems makes them incompatible to the 
privacy required by various stakeholders in its ecosystem; especially when critical information 
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is gathered to optimise corporate decision-making processes, develop business strategies 
and forecast future outcomes (Zyskind, Nathan and Pentland, 2015).  Therefore, technology-
based solutions like these need to develop data-protected blockchains that ensure concepts 
of value, security and trust are preserved while balancing the needs for both privacy and 
transparency. 
 
4.6.3 Network Influence 
A core requirement for blockchain systems is creating and maintaining a fully decentralised 
environment where governance is realised through consensus, however, the functionality of 
such implementations is highly dependent on the distribution and size of the network. In a 
decentralised, permission less network, where consensus is formed by majority, if any 
collusive effort gains control of a large enough portion of the nodes in the system, such a 
group would effectively gain majority network influence; enabling them to manipulate the 
validation process and the state of the blockchain. This concentrates computational power, 
network resources and authority over the blockchain in a fraction of self-interested nodes, 
which disrupts the parity of network influence and renders it insecure. 
 
For this reason, Eyal and Sirer (2014) explain how such a scenario is not incentive-compatible: 
as incentivising nodes is a key mechanism to maintaining the element of immutability, security 
and decentralisation within the network. The study introduces the Selfish Mining strategy, 
where malicious nodes aggregate their computational power to gain network influence and 
subsequently maximise their revenue (Kaushal, 2016b). It takes advantage of the indefinite 
state of the blockchain, leaving honest nodes to waste computational resources--bearing 
significant financial costs--by attempting to append blocks destined not to be recorded in the 
global state. This disincentivises honest nodes from participating in the mining process and 
increases the centralisation factor that undermines decentralisation and creates 
disproportionate network influence in favour of malicious nodes (Yli-Huumo et al., 2016). The 
security of the system is compromised by the uncertainty of assigning trust to a coalition of 
malicious nodes that are responsible for maintaining the integrity and appropriateness of the 
blockchain. 
 
To that end, a malicious node could reverse transactions and engage in double spending. By 
gaining more than 51% of the computing power, malicious nodes obtain the authority of 
determining which blocks are permissible (Lin and Liao, 2017). Double spending entails the 
risk of counterparty default where illicit nodes exploit network influence by attempting to 
convince the entire network to accept an alternative history in which the payment was not 
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conducted; allowing the sender to spend a given amount of cryptocurrency more than once. 
The intended recipient is convinced that a transaction has been confirmed while payment is 
later realised to be invalid. The possibility of double-spending can undermine the usage of the 
cryptocurrency, especially in the field of trade finance where vendors rely on fast payment 
systems. Vendors are more likely to deliver service/goods without waiting for transaction 
verification. Furthermore, the security of cryptocurrencies is congruent with the irreversibility 
of its transactions, however, double spending poses the threat of facilitating illicit activities 
when nodes reverse disbursed payments without returning the delivered service/goods 
intentionally. 
 
4.7 Economic Drawbacks 
4.7.1 Redundancy 
In an ecosystem comprising of stakeholders with different contributions to the network, it would 
not be economically viable for the blockchain to be independently processed by every node in 
the network. However, due to the property of log replication with blockchain systems, every 
participant is required to record every transaction to be added to the blockchain. This 
redundancy increases the costs and work done to achieve consensus, whose only benefit is 
to eliminate the inefficiencies of intermediation (Ammous, 2016). There is need reduce the 
running costs required to develop and sustain a blockchain system—mainly due to the large 
storage space required for each copy of the blockchain, the greater energy consumption and 
uptime costs of maintaining online computing systems, and the overall processing power 
needed to process new transactions / blocks. 
 
4.7.2 Cost Mutualisation 
Misaligned incentives in a financial industry often describe how different entities may hold 
conflicting priorities to achieving the level of ecosystem coordination that ensures value 
creation in the financial sector (Voshmgir, 2017). Without a unified approach to mutualising 
the costs of developing blockchain infrastructure, competing actors in the value chain will not 
be sufficiently incentivised to develop competencies for standards, technical protocol choices, 
legal and regulatory issues. Due to reliance on the formation of an ecosystem before 
potentialities can be realised, developing blockchain application often magnifies the perceived 
risks and costs associated with collaborative development. Niforos, Ramchandran and 
Rehermann (2017) encourages firms in the financial sector to establish consortiums that 
mutualise the cost of blockchain infrastructure, reframing their applications as interoperable 
industry utilities. 
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4.7.3 Financial Crime 
Although this technology purports to bring efficiencies in the banking industry, the concept of 
disintermediating the role of central counterparties, authorities and financial institutions has 
led to the risk of legal uncertainty and regulatory oversight which enables financial crime. Due 
to the lack of a universal, comprehensive and transparent approach to monitoring the adoption 
of cryptocurrencies and related technology, the widespread usage of DLT has inadvertently 
facilitated opportunities for illicit actors to conduct tax evasion, money-laundering, illicit trade 
and financial fraud. 
 
Financial crime risks are dynamic, with malicious actors constantly adapting to discover new 
opportunities to conduct terrorist financing, identity theft and Ponzi schemes. In the banking 
industry, financial institutions rely on risk management practices of non-dynamic systems and 
outdated transaction approaches that do not reflect the challenges faced currently in providing 
financial services. This entails developing a framework that determines the financial crime risk 
exposure involved in developing financial platforms supported by blockchain solutions and 
considering the institution’s specific market, service offering and product strategies (KPMG, 
2018). 
 
For example, cryptocurrencies establish global payment networks that are permission-less in 
nature, therefore, the lack of traceability and emphasis on pseudo-anonymity inherent within 
implementations such as Zcash, Monero and Dash enables financial crime to grow in scale 
and sophistication. While system vulnerabilities in providing financial services such as 
issuance, executing transactions and wallet management are threatened by the overwhelming 
occurrence of cyber-attacks, there is need to integrate regulatory proceedings and law 
enforcement procedures within the security and controlling functions of DLTs to alleviate these 
concerns. 
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5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this study is to highlight the importance and significance of blockchain 
technology in the financial industry beyond the application of cryptocurrencies. The lack of 
clarity regarding how the technology would interact with existing systems indicates a 
significant challenge to achieving critical mass of adoption for use-cases and applications in 
the industry. To contribute in this field, this dissertation provides evidence on business gains 
and the wider financial impact of DLT/blockchain solutions realised from the deployment of 
real-world applications. 
 
A recurring consequence of applications and use-cases supported by blockchain technology 
is their ability to provide the financial industry an opportunity to address limitations and 
inefficiencies of central counterparties, regulatory standards, payment systems and other 
financial systems. For the financial industry, this innovation disrupts the concept of trust, 
accountability and exchange of the standardised, and centralised operational processes of 
existing financial infrastructures. It heralds a frontier of digital financial platforms that facilitate 
safety, stability and efficiency within business processes and financial workflows without the 
intervention of a third party. 
 
Evaluating key aspects of this technology gives depth to the potential to disrupt existing 
infrastructures and industry standards within financial systems. On account of the various 
innovations and applications that are discussed throughout the study, key findings suggest 
that blockchain technology has the potential to increase transparency and accountability, 
reduce transaction and monitoring costs, improve real-time data collection and analysis 
possibilities, and expand participation opportunities for currently vulnerable, excluded, and 
underserved populations (Ferrarini, et al., 2017). These opportunities are discussed through 
examining the implications for this technology in the field of: payments; clearing and 
settlement; trade finance; and capital markets. 
 
Following on, this study elaborates upon innovations of smart contracts, DAOs and ICOs that 
have leveraged blockchain technology to develop a wide range of financial functions: 
information management, value exchange, regulatory reporting, asset servicing and 
automating financial contracts. These functions provide opportunities for reconfiguring 
business models, creating new products and services, and bringing innovation into industry. 
As a decentralised, trust less, immutable and censorship resistant environment, this 
technology creates an ecosystem for individuals, organisations and authorities that embrace 
a generation of transformational digital approaches in finance. 
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The business model associated with the application of blockchain technology is fundamentally 
different from any existing business model of value transfer and ownership management. As 
a result, the previous chapter addresses the key challenges that currently limit blockchain 
technology from becoming an integral component of many financial networks. Key findings on 
these issues imply that the potential for this technology can only be maximised by speeding 
regulatory framework, industry practices and institutional changes up to the pace of this 
innovation. This entails aligning many highly complex regulatory, operational and legal 
functions of existing financial systems to the characteristics of immutable and unstoppable 
execution that describes DLTs. 
 
Henceforth, there is need for a rigorous analysis and experimentation of blockchain technology 
prior to any large-scale deployment. As the understanding of this technology develops, 
different use-cases will emerge, prompting adjustments for changes in capacity and 
performance characteristics, network membership, identity management and interoperability 
and other non-functional requirements that describe ownership and accountability in that 
environment. By developing adjusted frameworks taking account of the characteristics, actors 
with this ecosystem enable industry coordination and collaboration towards establishing 
standards and fostering changes in the perception of the technology. The widespread 
adoption and use of these standards could facilitate a surge of innovation, productivity and 
industry opportunities. 
 
Overall, expectations for the blockchain technology are still within grassroot levels but current 
applications in the financial industry have shown significant potential to improve operational 
resilience and financial stability and reduce market distortions and illegal activities within digital 
platforms that govern financial networks. Blockchain technology offers an opportunity for new 
ways of clearing and settlement, information exchange, recording and reporting that will bring 
innovation in the financial industry. 
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